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INDIA IN WORLD POLITICS

India in World Politics

BY

TARAKNATH DAS, A.M.

Author of "Is Japan a Menace to Asia?" etc.



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TO
THE CAUSE OF WORLD PEACE
WITH JUSTICE AND LIBERTY TO ALL PEOPLES

"A statesman is the child of circumstances, a creature of his time; a statesman is essentially a practical character, and when called to the helm of affairs he has not to enquire what may, in the past, have been his views on this or that subject. He has only to ascertain what is necessary and to discover the most satisfactory and complete method in which affairs can be conducted. I laugh at the objection brought against anyone that at some earlier period in his career he urged a policy different from that which he advocates at the present. All I ask is that his present policy be calculated to achieve its end, and that he at the present moment be determined to serve his country in her present circumstances."

Disraeli.

(The ablest of British Imperialists)

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INTRODUCTION

The history of civilization is that of a succession of empires. No sooner did a city arrive at a stage of advancement beyond its neighbors than it sought to express its civic consciousness by extending its rule over surrounding territory; and no sooner were men of the same race united by national consciousness than they sought to manifest their superiority by the conquest of other races and nations. Almost every people has been subject at some time or other to the imperialistic urge; and political institutions, whether tyranny, theocracy, oligarchy, or democracy, have lent themselves with equal freedom to its satisfaction. The long procession of empires, beginning with those of the Nile and the Euphrates valleys, includes Persia, Athens, Macedon, Rome, the Arabs, the Turks, Venice, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Sweden, France, Russia, Germany, Great Britain. Indeed, Mr. Scott Nearing raises the question, surprising to most of us, whether the United States is not an empire. We must agree that it will become so when its preoccupation with the rule of foreign possessions and dependencies becomes the controlling influence in its national policy.

The classic and typical case of empire in the world today is that of the British, and the core of

that empire is India. Never before has a single group of such magnitude been held in subjection to another. The British Empire has indeed two aspects, that presented by the association of self-governing commonwealths and that presented by the foreign possessions of which India is incomparably the chief. When they think of the former, British statesmen have ceased to think imperially, they have learned to think in terms of commonwealths. When they think of India, though they profess and even believe that their thought is entirely in the interest of India's welfare, they necessarily think in terms of British rule. India is the foundation of that imperial edifice which Lord Curzon felicitously compares to Tennyson's Palace of Art, possibly forgetting the tragedy of the soul which inhabited it. The question of imperialism, therefore—and if history means anything this is a question which the world must continue to face with arms until it is settled by reason—is peculiarly a question of India, and the freedom of India is thus essentially an interest of the world.

It is the special merit of Mr. Das's book that he brings out, largely by citations from British authorities, the extent to which the foreign policy of Great Britain has been determined by the possession of India. Since the end of the eighteenth century, when the immense legacy of the Moguls fell into her hands, her heart has been increasingly with this treasure; and her attitude with respect to her neighbors has varied from conciliation to suspi-

cion and hostility in the measure as their looks toward it became covetous or their gestures threatening. And on the other hand this treasure has been a challenge, a temptation, and an example to her rivals, who, moreover, have not failed to take advantage of this preoccupation of Great Britain to disturb her domestic security by alarms and to embroil her people in distant quarrels. It was the Napoleonic feint toward India that made the enmity of Great Britain implacable. It was the advance of Russia in Asia that committed Great Britain to the long continued policy of favoring the Turks. The possession of India determined the Asiatic policy of Great Britain, and her relations with Persia, Japan, and, to a greater extent than appears on the surface, with China. Fear for the Suez route to India forced Great Britain's hand against Egypt, and jealousy of the Bagdad route arrayed her against Germany. It is not too much to say that this gold hoard in the East caused Great Britain, like the giant Fafner, to turn herself into a dragon, watchful, warlike, ready to rush from its cave breathing fire, its existence a curse and a menace. Only this must be added, that instead of a mass of metal, the treasure over which Great Britain stands guard is composed of human beings. It would be a subject for a companion study to this of Mr. Das's to show how this tortuous and faithless foreign policy finds its reflection point by point in India, in a domestic régime of suppression and cruelty.

In the first place, then, this book is addressed to the public of Great Britain, where foreign policy has traditionally remained in the hands of the feudal aristocracy. One of the boasted gains of the late war is the assumption of democratic control over this policy. It is surely proper for the people who propose in future to have something to say about the conquests, alliances and wars which are conducted in their name, to acquaint themselves with the main springs of that policy to which their welfare and their lives are regularly sacrificed. One of the questions which the British democracy will have to meet in the immediate future is that of the value of the Indian connection to Great Britain itself, to India, to the world. Englishmen like Mr. Lionel Curtis have persuaded themselves that the position of India within the British Empire is an advantage from all three points of view. How can this be asserted in the face of the story of the poisoning of the springs of healthy, fruitful intercourse between Great Britain and the world? Wilfrid Blunt in his *Diaries* tells of a conversation between George Wyndham and himself in which it was agreed that if England were governed as in the eighteenth century, the oligarchy would cut loose from India—a course which today in the face of popular government no ministry could undertake and survive. It has been noted above that imperialism is a disease of nationalism from which democracy is not exempt, to which its yielding is, in fact, the more fatal. All the more reason then

why it should purge itself of the taint by the exercise of intelligence and reason.

In the second place, Mr. Das addresses his book to India. It is by the acquiescence of the world that Great Britain has been able to maintain itself in possession of the Indian Empire, an acquiescence secured by propaganda, intrigue, quid pro quo, alliance, intimidation, and war. It is only because of the myopic vision with which we tend to view the ethics of nations that the holding in political subjugation and social inferiority of three hundred millions of human beings by forty millions, who are for the most part entirely ignorant of and uninterested in their wards, does not appear at once as a hideous abnormality. Mr. Das argues that if this relation is to be broken it must be by the withdrawal of such acquiescence and to this end India must cultivate foreign relations of her own. He doubtless has in mind the part which the benevolent attitude of foreign countries had in securing the freedom of Italy from Austria; and of the American Colonies from Great Britain. For the Indians, looking toward a career as a nation, an explanation of the game of world politics in which they have been so long the prize will be a necessary text book.

But above all Mr. Das addresses his book to the world, to that part of the world at least in which the mind is open and opinion is free on the subject of imperialism. Modern imperialism is no longer frankly predatory. It adopts a camouflage of

benevolence and sentimentalizes itself as the white man's burden. It has tried to lay at rest the scandalous competition of the great powers in seizing the property of the weaker by organizing itself as the mandate trust of the League of Nations, a plunderbund for the benefit of the plundered. Under such hypocritical forms imperialism has made a great advance in the public opinion of the United States. With the merging of our western frontier in the Pacific Ocean our spirit of aggrandizement has gone forth to Hawaii, to the Philippines, to Cuba and Haiti, and hungrily envisages Mexico, always, be it understood, to uplift and protect. And with this account opened in the ledger of imperialism we tend to be less critical of the solvency of other imperialistic enterprises. Roosevelt with Panama and the Canal Zone on his conscience could not help addressing words of warm congratulation to the English on their superb performance in Egypt. Now Mr. Das offers us a fair account of one phase of imperialism, its bearing on the inter-relations of nations—a judgment and a warning. He asks us to consider in the light of history whether it is desirable for the world that the great classic instance of imperialism should continue. The freeing of India would go farther than any other conceivable action toward the settling of the question of imperial control throughout the world. And India would be freed if the world viewed the monstrous nature of her subjection with clear, truthful eyes. Particularly

could public opinion in the United States forward this result if it were as honest and generous as English public opinion was toward struggling Italy. We have heard much against shaking the bloody hand of Moscow. Let us consider whether the hand of London is any cleaner. Thus Mr. Das calls us to judgment; and at the same time he offers us a warning of the incredible complications into which our own imperialistic ventures may lead us, the mess of policy into which we shall be plunged to the exclusion of pressing considerations of domestic welfare, when we have fully given hostages to fortune. It is to be noted that Mr. Das does not plead the cause of India in the name of her own sufferings and indignities. He pleads it in the name of such honor as may be left among nations, in the name of British democracy, in the name of the world, so greatly in need of an act of healing and cleansing.

ROBERT MORSS LOVETT.

India in World Politics

I

INDIA AND THE GROWTH OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

COBDEN, addressing the British House of Commons on June 27, 1853, said: "The English race can never become indigenous to India; we must govern it, if we govern it at all, by means of a succession of transient visits; and I do not think it is for the interest of the English people, any more than it is for the people of India, that we should govern them permanently. . . . I see no benefit which can arise to the mass of the English people from their connection with India, except that which may arise from honest trade." ¹

The Indian people realize ever more clearly the truth of this statement. Modern British statesmanship appears blind to it, however, and is working strenuously to stave off the day when India will free herself from British Imperialism. Indian statesmen, even the most moderate, appreciate that the time will come when India will assert her inde-

¹ JONES, EDGAR R.: *Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy, 1738-1914*, p. 508.

pendence. Still, the leaders of this school minimize—some of them ignore—the importance of establishing foreign relations with nations abroad while carrying on the struggle for independence at home. It is true that home work will play the most important part in freeing India from the foreign yoke, but India cannot remain unmindful of the need of establishing direct foreign relations with other nations.

India's dominant geographical position, her resources, her commerce, her culture must inevitably compel her to be a part of the world movement. William H. Seward remarked: "European thought, European commerce, and European enterprise, although actually gaining in force, and European connections, although becoming more and more intimate, will nevertheless relatively sink in importance in the future, while the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and adjacent territories will become the chief theatre of human events and activities in the world's great hereafter." And the years following the conclusion of the World War have made increasingly evident the wisdom of these words of America's great Secretary of State.

It has been through India that Asia has been involved in the intrigues of European diplomacy. British foreign policy during the last three centuries has been greatly influenced by its strong determination to control India, because control of India is necessary for the maintenance of British supremacy

in Europe and in Asia, and in world politics generally.

There are still those in India who depend upon British liberals and British labor to do justice to the people of India. This is a vain hope. Whatever of democracy has been gained by the English people in respect to suffrage and personal rights, its influence does not extend to the foreign office nor govern Britain's foreign policy. British liberals and British labor do not dream of giving up any part of the Empire. In this respect there is practically no division of opinion between different groups in England. The spirit which animates British foreign policy is the preservation and expansion of the Empire: "Nothing changes in the character and view of our [British] foreign policy. We seek to be at peace everywhere and to make acquisitions without war, always keeping ourselves on the defensive; we place no faith in the friendships of those whose interests do not accord with our own, and we lose no opportunity of injuring them, without ostensibly violating treaties." ²

England's interest is concentrated on sea power. General Homer Lea quotes the words of the Marquis of Salisbury to prove that the power of British Imperialism is dependent on her control of the sea: "There have been great colonial and maritime powers, four or five, but they have always fallen. . . . If we ever allow our defences at sea to fall

² CARGILL, WILLIAM: *Foreign Affairs of Great Britain Administered by Palmerston*, p. 27, ff.

to such a point of inefficiency that it is as easy, or nearly as easy, to cross the sea as it is to cross a land frontier, our great empire, stretching to the ends of the earth, supported by maritime force in every part of it, will come clattering to the ground when a blow at the metropolis of England is struck." ³

Britain can never give up the control of India.

"India may in fact be regarded as the centre or pivot of Britain's Empire in the East; and for this reason alone, setting aside all other considerations, must be defended against foreign aggressions. It is not only British supremacy in that country itself which is at stake; the uninterrupted intercourse with her eastern colonies themselves would at once be threatened, should foreign invasion take place." ⁴

India therefore is a necessity to England's imperial system and naval communication. The salient points in the development of British sea power have been admirably summarized by Arthur Jose. Drawing an analogy between the Roman and British Empires he says: "The Romans, planting themselves in military settlements over the lands they subdued, bound these outposts of their Empire together with great highroads, and guarded the roads with forts at every crossing. . . ." Just so today the British Empire is bound together with our ocean highways, and those ways are guarded from end to end not only by the settlements they thread,

³ LEA, HOMER: *The Valor of Ignorance*, p. 119.

⁴ COLQUHOUN, SIR ARCHIBALD: *Russia Against India*, page 203.

but by military stations and stations that, though they have now grown into industrial communities, were first and are primarily of military importance.

“As usual, we began with no definite plans, and it was the French who first taught us the strategic value of these intermediate seaports. But some of them we had obtained for other reasons. St. Helena had thus in 1651 become our half-way house on the Cape route to India; and Gibraltar was seized in 1734 that we might keep free to our trade the gate of the Mediterranean. Presently the raids of Anson on Spain’s South American colonies suggested the utility of procuring another half-way house on our warships’ route to the Pacific; and when the Seven Years’ War was over we annexed and partially occupied the Falkland Islands. But now France, sore with the loss of Canada and India, bethought her of the revenge offered by a privateering war—a *guerre de course* such as the French navy still dreams of—and by the way of preparation marked down the harbours from which our East Indian trade could be most easily attacked. We did not come so well out of the American War as to stop her from proceeding with these plans; but the great war—Revolutionary and Napoleonic—was decisive enough to give British Ministers whatever they chose to take. It had been long enough, too, to disclose fully the whole scheme by which our greatest enemy hoped to destroy our Empire. Napoleon harassed our Indian convoys from the Mauritius; but his hope had been to create for our de-

struction a French route to India, either by Egypt and the Red Sea, or, later, by some overland route to Persia and the Gulf. On the lines he thus made clear it became our policy to establish a secure defence, either making the new roads or at least blocking their entrances and exits. The policy has been carried out spasmodically, it is true; there have been intervals when it seemed forgotten, years when it was well nigh reversed; but that way the current has tended, and its results are clear on the map today.

“For these are the great ocean-roads of trade: Firstly, those that run east and west across the North Atlantic and North Pacific, free along their whole length from possible hostile land. On these it is as much as we can hope to hold fortified posts at either end: in the Atlantic our British and Canadian ports (and the Bermudas), in the North Pacific Esquimaux on Vancouver Island and Hong Kong. Secondly, those that connect Europe eastwardly with Southern Asia—the Cape route, the Red Sea route, and that by the Persian Gulf. We guard our Cape route with the watch-ports at Gibraltar and Freetown and Simon’s Bay, and the stations at St. Helena and Ascension (occupied in 1815), while the tiny settlement on Tristan da Cunha prevents any inimical use of it in anticipation of war. In the Indian Ocean Mauritius and its dependencies, Rodriguez (1809), the Seychelles (1794), the Chagos and Amirante groups and their many smaller neighbors, prolong our line to Ceylon, and

it is extended past Further India to North China by the Straits Settlements, Labuan, Hong Kong, and Weihaiwei. Gibraltar, Malta (1800), and Cyprus (1878), protect the Mediterranean road: Aden and Perim (1857) watch the Red Sea mouth, which is further secured by British protectorates over northern Somaliland (1884-6) and Socotra (1886). The Persian Gulf is blocked by our station at Bahrein (1867) well within our agency at Muscat, and our ownership of the Baluchistan coast.

"A third series of trade-routes brings to us the commerce of South America, from both its eastern and its western parts, and most of the sailing-ships that carry Australian wares. On this we have no harbour of our own but the Falklands. But its possible supplanter, the highway that may soon be opened through the Caribbean Sea and Nicaragua and the tropical Pacific, is well guarded for us: though the German flag flies in Samoa, and the French over the eastern groups—Marquesas, Society, and their neighbors—nearly all the other groups are ours, Fiji and Tonga and Hervey, Gilbert and Ellice, and southern Melanesia; watched and counted not only by the men of our new Commonwealth in those seas, but by their fellow-islanders of New Zealand, who hope still, as Grey taught them, to be the headquarters of a Polynesian confederacy under the Imperial flag." ⁵

In this expansion, India has been the central mo-

⁵ JOSE, ARTHUR: *The Growth of the Empire*, pp. 394-397.

tive. As Mr. Jose puts it: "To reach India our adventurers threw themselves upon America; to guard the Indian trade we seized South Africa; upon India converge the routes that are dotted from end to end with our forts and coaling stations. And the struggle for India has been a struggle against France. From France we took Canada; just, and only just ahead of France we secured Australasia; it was for fear of France that we deprived Holland of the Cape Colony."

As pointed out by General Lea, British dominion consists of one-fourth of the land surface, and the suzerainty of the Five Seas. He comments, "It is over this seventeen-twentieths of the world that broods the jealous yet anxious scowl of the Saxon race. That British rule should, in various degrees of sovereignty, exercise its dominion over seventeen-twentieths of the world's surface is significant of just that degree of repression toward all other nations, their rights and expansion by land or by sea." ⁶

It is only necessary to visualize the gains made by the British Empire in Asia and Africa and in Pacific waters through the World War in order to appreciate the significance of the following paragraph by the same authority.

"It is not so much in the vastness of British possessions that are found conditions provocative of war as it is in its geographical distribution. It is not a segregated sovereignty occupying, as the

⁶ LEA, HOMER: *The Day of the Saxon*, p. 15.

Russian Empire, a corner or contiguous portion of the earth, but forms, on the other hand, a circle around the entire globe, within which are placed all the other powers of the world; and not one of them can follow their lines of natural expansion without, sooner or later, being brought into direct contact with the British Dominion.”⁷

In the opinion of General Lea, there are but three countries that possess pre-eminent strategic positions: The British Islands, the Japanese Islands, and India.

“The Indian Empire is in the strategic centre of the third most important portion of the globe. Its influence has had its effect upon the European mind from the earliest times; and in the future the power of its strategic position as a determinate factor in world politics will increase with each international readjustment.”⁸

Lord Curzon says: “But her control and commanding position is nowhere better seen than in the political influence which she exercises over the destinies of her neighbours near and far, and the extent to which their fortunes revolve upon an Indian axis. *The independence of Afghanistan, the continued national existence of Persia, the maintenance of Turkish rule at Bagdad, are one and all dependent upon Calcutta. Nay, the radiating circle of her influence overlaps the adjoining continents, and affects alike the fate of the Bosphorus and*

⁷ *IBID.*, p. 16.

⁸ *IBID.*, p. 63.

the destinies of Egypt. Nor is the effect less remarkable if examined upon the eastern side. . . . It is from jealousy of India and to impair the position which India gives to Britain in the Far East, France has again embarked upon an Asiatic career, and is advancing from the south-east with steps that faithfully correspond with those of Russia upon the north-west. The heritage of the Indian Empire has within the last ten years made us the land neighbours of China, and has multiplied threefold the area of our diplomacy at Peking. Even the fortunes of remote Korea are in a manner bound up with the politics of Hindustan, seeing that it is by the same foe (Russia) that, in the last resort, both are threatened, and that the tactics which aim at appropriation of the smaller units have as their ulterior objective the detriment of the greater; such and so supreme is the position enjoyed in the Asian continent by the Empire of the Kaiser-i-Hind. Towards her, or into her orbit, a centripetal force, which none appears able to resist, draws every wandering star. Just as Europe turns upon the dismemberment of Turkey, so the Eastern question in Asia turns upon the continued solidarity of Hindustan.”⁹

Lord Curzon, as the Viceroy of India, in a speech delivered in the India Council on March 25, 1903, makes it clear that India is the centre of British world policies, particularly Asia :

“Our Indian dominions more directly touch those

⁹ CURZON: *Problems of the Far East*, pp. 8-9.

of Turkey and in many parts of the Arabian peninsula, those of Russia on the Pamirs, those of China along the borders of Turkestan, and Yunan, those of France on the upper Mekong. In our dealings with them the Foreign Department in India is becoming the Asiatic branch of the Foreign in England. . . . The geographical position of India will more and more push her into the forefront of international politics, she will more and more become the strategical frontier of the British Empire."

While speaking before the London Society of Pilgrims at the Savoy Hotel, Field Marshal Lord Roberts presiding, Lord Curzon on April 6, 1906, said:

"But when you remember that three out of every four of these subjects of the king are in India, that Calcutta, the capital of India, the next city in size to London in the whole British Empire, that with the possible exception of China, India is the largest and most populous political aggregation in the universe, then I think you will begin to realise to what extent the British Empire is an Asiatic Empire, and how, if we cut out the Asiatic portion of it, it would infallibly dwindle in scale and importance. I sometimes like to picture to myself this great Imperial fabric as a huge structure, like some Tennysonian 'Palace of Art' of which the foundations are in this country [England], where they have been laid and must be maintained by British hands, but of which the colonies are the pillars and

then high above all floats the vastness of an Asiatic dome." ¹⁰

It is the motive of expansion of the Empire of Britain that has caused wars during the past centuries and this motive is threatening the world peace today. India forms the centre of this Imperial system and Britain keeps India under subjection to maintain her dominant imperial position all over the world.

¹⁰ CURZON: *Subjects of the Day*, p. 28.

II

ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY IN INDIA, 1763-1815

INDIA played an important part in the shaping of British foreign policy as early as 1688, in the reign of William III. Arthur Russell in his work on British foreign policy writes: "At the outset the object of the foreign policy of England on William's accession was to defeat the project of Louis XIV indirectly in the colonies and India and more directly in Ireland and on the continent." ¹¹

The same author points out that "after the Treaty of Utrecht, the character of the conflict with France and Spain changes, and the issues become more vital. The struggle between Great Britain and the Bourbons is for ascendancy on the sea, in India, in the West Indies and on the American continent." ¹²

The Treaty of Paris (1763), established Great Britain as the leading state in the world. Mr. Russell estimates the relative positions of England and France in the following words: "The peace was the culminating point of British power in the eighteenth century, nay, relatively to all other

¹¹ RUSSELL, ARTHUR: *History of British Foreign Policy*, p. 157.

¹² *IBID.*, p. 172.

states, England has never since been so great. The foundation of the British Empire was laid, its future expansion in India and Canada was assured. It was not however, till the fall of Napoleon that the British Empire was free to expand without danger of any serious interruption from external foes." ¹³

The period of 1739-1763 has been characterized by Professor Montague Burrows as the period in which the dramas enacted on the plains of Bengal and Karnatics paved the way for British supremacy in India.

Referring to the principles that governed British foreign policy during the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), Burrows recognizes the important elements which have determined Britain's later policy as well. He points out, ". . . the recovery of an imperial position by the British people was marked by the welding of the old and the new elements of foreign policy. . . . The security of the country from invasion was to be guarded as of old by sea supremacy. The coasts of the Netherlands must be in friendly hands; the colonies must be saved from absorption by the French and Spaniards, who had been for so long a time laying their hostile plans; India must be kept free for the development of British trade and government; the Mediterranean must be retained at any cost by a sufficient fleet and by the help of its fortified depots at Gibraltar

¹³ RUSSELL, ARTHUR: *History of British Foreign Policy*, p. 199.

and Minorca. For the latter of these, Malta later on became the substitute." ¹⁴

Anglo-French hostility during the period of the French Revolution, particularly between the years 1793 and 1800, was intensified by the Indian question. "Great Britain would never have given up the struggle for the Mediterranean; Napoleon would never have rested till he had acquired the command of it. . . . The eyes of the brilliant young conqueror (Napoleon) turned towards the alternative of ruining the only country which he really feared, by blocking her way to India through the roads of Egypt and Turkey and by setting up at Constantinople a great French Empire which might gradually tear away India by the help of a French organization of the great Marhatta princes." ¹⁵

The Indian problem influenced French diplomacy in regard to extending aid to the American colonies fighting against Great Britain. Wharton, in his "Diplomatic History of the American Revolution" correctly analyzes the situation: "It would be a mistake to attribute the French support of America exclusively to a feeling of revenge for the humiliations of the prior war. Other motives came in and exercised decisive influence. There was a conviction and a right one in France that for Britain to hold under control the whole of North America as

¹⁴ BURROWS, MONTAGUE: *The History of the Foreign Policy of Great Britain*, p. 114.

¹⁵ BURROWS, *Ibid.*, p. 197.

well as India would give her a maritime supremacy as well as a superiority in wealth which will constitute a standing menace to the rest of the world." ¹⁶

William Pitt, more than any other statesman, was responsible for the policy which led to the triumph of England over France in the Seven Years' War. It was he who realized that France should be defeated, not on the banks of the Rhine, but in her colonies. In the reconstruction period which followed the Treaty of Paris, Pitt was the master mind who made it possible for England to progress on her imperial career.

Discussing Pitt's foreign policy in respect to the Orient, Gerald Burkeley Hertz writes: "Pitt looked beyond the obvious and present facts, and foresaw the cloud that during the following century darkened the horizon of British India. If his means were not wholly happy in 1791, his ends at least have commended themselves to posterity. He sought to strengthen British influence in the East, to enforce peace throughout Europe, to lighten the heavy burden of safe-guarding the north-western frontier of India, and to postpone, for so long a period as might be possible, the extension of Russian sovereignties to the shores of the Mediterranean." ¹⁷

During the period of the Napoleonic War about

¹⁶ WHARTON: *Diplomatic History of the American Revolution*, Vol. 1, p. 43.

¹⁷ HERTZ, GERALD BURKELEY: *British Imperialism in the Eighteenth Century*, pp. 208-209.

1807-1808, Britain took possession of the Dutch territory of Cape of Good Hope for the sake of India; and Professor Burrows speaks of this incident in the following way:

"Almost unobserved, however, a Dutch colony was at this very time appropriated by the British and quite unexpected consequences have resulted. It was the Cape of Good Hope, which seemed at first to be only useful as commanding the highway to India, but which has led to the extension of British power and influence over a large portion of the African continent." ¹⁸

At the Congress of Vienna (1815) Britain's policy was largely determined by the desire to control the trade-routes to India. "Of all that she had taken from France and her allies, she retained only the necessary posts of her commerce in India. The Mediterranean, the West Indies and the German Ocean, the Isle of France, Malta, Heligoland, Tobago, and St. Lucia formed the whole of her [Britain's] gain." ¹⁹

Since 1827, according to Professor Burrows, India has been the centre of Britain's Oriental policy: "She [Britain] had conquered the Mediterranean at the Battle of the Nile; and every day made it more apparent to statesmen that India could not be retained if a hostile power occupied the Levant. Each year also the enormous responsibility which the possession of India meant was brought more

¹⁸ BURROWS, MONTAGUE: *History of Foreign Policy of Great Britain*, p. 247.

¹⁹ *IBID.*, p. 308.

and more home to the British nation by dangerous wars and insurrections.”²⁰

Earl Curzon, recently British Foreign Minister and former Viceroy of India, in his most remarkable work, “The Problems of the Far East,” published in 1894, admits in unmistakable terms that India is the foundation stone of the British Empire. “Whatever the future may bring forth to this country [England],” he writes, “it cannot fail to be a matter of capital importance, seeing that the Empire of Great Britain, though a European, a Canadian and Australian, is before all else an Asiatic Dominion. We still are, and have it in our hands to remain, the First Power in the East. Just as De Tocqueville remarked that the conquest and government of India are really the achievements which have given England her place in the opinion of the world, so it is the prestige and the wealth arising from her Asiatic position that are the foundation stones of the British Empire.”²¹

²⁰ BURROWS, MONTAGUE: *History of Foreign Policy of Great Britain*, p. 350.

²¹ CURZON, EARL: *Problems of the Far East*, p. 414.

III

ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS ON THE INDIAN FRONTIER

PROFESSOR HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS, in referring to the influence of India upon England's foreign relations, says, "None can understand the foreign policy of Great Britain, which has inspired military and diplomatic activities from the Napoleonic Wars to the present day, who does not interpret wars, diplomatic conflicts, treaties and alliances, territorial annexations, extensions of protectorates, with the fact of India constantly in mind." ²²

The advent of Russia on the Indian frontier after the French danger had paled and vanished is described by Arthur Jose, in a graphic manner: "and then from the landward, across the deserts and the mountain ranges of our northeastern frontier, loomed up the shadow of a more gigantic rival, of whom little was understood and nothing could be predicted but unremitting progress and increasing power."

The First Afghan War, in 1838, resulted from the penetration of Russian agents into Afghanistan and the friendly reception accorded to them by the

²² GIBBONS, HERBERT ADAMS: *The New Map of Asia*, p. 4.

ruler of that state. William Cargill points out that during Palmerston's administration because of the Indian question there was constant conflict between Russian and British policies. He analyzes the situation as follows: "According to what we have here been advancing, the objects of Russia, as laid down by Peter the Great are:

1. The acquisition of Turkey, and seizure of Constantinople.
2. The domination of Persia and Central Asia.
3. The possession of the Black Sea, the Caspian and the extension of influence to the Levant and Mediterranean and possession of India."²³

The article of the Will of Peter the Great which directly deals about India is as follows:

"Art. VIII. Bear in mind that the commerce of India is the commerce of the world, and that he who can exclusively command it is dictator of Europe. No occasion should therefore be lost to provoke war with Persia, to hasten its decay, to advance on the Persian Gulf, and then to endeavour to re-establish the ancient trade of Levant through Syria."²⁴

Referring to Britain's anti-French and anti-Russian policy even after the Franco-Prussian War, Professor Charles Cestre writes: "After 1870,

²³ CARGILL, WILLIAM: *Foreign Affairs of Great Britain Administered by Palmerston*, pp. 25-26.

²⁴ SIR ARCHIBALD COLQUHOUN gives the complete text of *The Will of Peter the Great* as given in *De Progres de la Puissance Russe* by M. LESUR published in Paris 1812, in his work *Russia Against India*, pp. 239-240.

England at first remained faithful to the policy which, with few exceptions had been the constant rule for her exterior relations, namely, more or less direct co-operation with the states of Central Europe against France and Russia. . . . France, despite her reverses, continued to be the distrusted neighbour. She stood at the gates of the channel, she was a great sea power, and since the consolidation of her Algerian possessions, she was a great Mediterranean power as well. Russia was the suspected neighbour at the frontiers of India, disturbing on account of the incessant growth of her population, her uninterrupted penetration of Asia and her desire to open a way into the Mediterranean. Consequently there was a tendency on the part of England, without abandoning her insular reserve, to favor the policy of Germany and Austria and to check the policy of France and Russia.”²⁵ According to the same authority, “England could not allow Russia to use the disturbance in the Balkans as a pretext to enter Constantinople and become more than ever a menace to India. England consequently declared herself protectress of Turkey.”²⁶ He further comments: “After having constructed a barrier in the Congress of Berlin against the ‘Russian Spectre’ Disraeli prepared an era of conquering experience in Africa and Asia.”²⁷

²⁵ CESTRE, CHARLES: *France, England and European Democracy*, p. 73.

²⁶ *IBID.*, p. 75.

²⁷ *IBID.*, p. 76.

Professor Burrows refers to Anglo-Russian relations in the following terms: "Lord Beaconsfield's policy towards Russia was due to India. The specific points are (1) buying the Suez Canal, (2) securing Cyprus as the British station at Levant—as a result of the Crimean War, (3) Berlin Congress to restrain Russia from being all powerful regarding Turkish questions, menacing Britain in Asia, particularly in India." ²⁸

At this period England was not in a position to take Egyptian territory, and had no position in Egypt close to the Canal itself, and thus Cyprus, as the nearest island to the Suez Canal, offered special advantages. After the Treaty of San Stefano and the revision of the Russo-Turkish Treaty at Berlin, in 1878, the interest of Great Britain was directed to the south-east Mediterranean. "She decided that her permanent route to India was through the Suez Canal, and made it secure by getting possession of the majority of the shares of the Canal and by seizing Egypt." ²⁹

Lt.-Col. S. C. Vestal, in his recent book, confirms the judgment of earlier writers in respect to the influence which India has had on the course of Anglo-Russian relations. He says, "It is customary to class Anglo-Saxons as the least militant, the least war-like of the race. The fact is that these nations are the most war-like of living peoples. They are so war-like that they will not suffer any nation on

²⁸ BURROWS, p. 353.

²⁹ GIBBONS, HERBERT ADAMS: *The New Map of Europe*, p. 140.

the same continent or island with themselves against whom it is necessary to keep a large standing army on foot. . . .

“The Anglo-Saxon world taken as a unit has no frontier in close contact with a powerful nation. Its boundaries are formed by the sea or by the territories of weak people, from whom there is no cause to fear invasion. The north-west frontier of India is an apparent exception, but it is only apparent. The Russian territory is still a long way from the vital part of India; the frontier is strong by nature and has been strengthened by art; and the British have abundant means to bring to bear on Russia in other parts of the world whenever the north-west frontier is threatened. Nevertheless, it is true that the British foreign policy for seventy years has been dominated by the necessity of keeping Russia at a safe distance from India.”³⁰

Disraeli, speaking in the House of Commons on July 18, 1878, said: “Our Indian Empire on every occasion on which these discussions occur or these troubles occur, or these settlements occur [he was referring to the Berlin Treaty of 1878] is to England a source of grave anxiety, and the time appeared to have arrived, when, if possible, we should terminate that anxiety. . . . But yielding to Russia what she has obtained, we may say to her—Thus far and no further! Asia is large enough for both of us. There is no reason for these constant wars

³⁰ VESTAL, LT.-COL. S. C.: *The Maintenance of Peace*, p. 55. (This paragraph was written in 1912.)

or fears of wars between Russia and England. . . . But the room we require we must secure. We therefore entered into an alliance—a defensive alliance with Turkey to guard her against any further attack from Russia.”³¹

In the period following the Treaty of Berlin (1878) Russian relations with the Balkan countries produced a reaction against her in the minds of English conservatives. Russia’s approach to Constantinople filled them with consternation, for Constantinople guarded the gateway to Asia. Russian expansion into Central Asia alarmed the British Government and one of the means chosen to offset it was the creation of a buffer state out of Afghanistan. In retaliation, Russia tried to extend her influence all around Afghanistan, in Persia, in Turkestan, and followed this by the occupation of strategic trade centres in Central Asia. Tibet, a province of China, adjoining India on the northeastern boundary, became the counter goal of Russia, as an offset to British trade gains in Afghanistan. The rival claims of Russia and Britain in Persia were compromised by the Anglo-Persian Convention of 1907. Nevertheless, this country, as well as Afghanistan and Tibet, became to the Government of India and to the British Foreign Office, safeguards which must be added to the British Empire.

Next came the menace to India through Russia’s approach to the Persian Gulf and her interest in

³¹ JONES, EDGAR R.: *Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy, 1738-1914*, pp. 93-98.

Bagdad Railway. At this point a new rival threatened British prestige in the East, and the enmity formerly directed toward Russia was diverted to Germany. "Having compounded colonial rivalries with France and Russia, she had no way of arriving at a diplomatic understanding with Germany. 'The Bagdad Railway question was decided on battlefields from Flanders to Mesopotamia.'" ³²

³² GIBBONS, HERBERT ADAMS: *The New Map of Asia*, p. 12.

IV

ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS AND INDIA

THE general tendency of the foreign policy of Imperial Germany has been characterized by an American authority as an effort to acquire an empire of great magnitude, allying herself with Turkey against Britain and France.

"The rapid decline of the Ottoman Empire and the fact that its sovereign was Khalif of the Moslem world, led German statesmen to believe that Constantinople was the best place in the world to centre the efforts of their diplomacy in the development of the *Weltpolitik*. Through allying herself with the Khalif, Germany would find herself able to strike eventually at the British occupation of India and Egypt, and the French occupation of Algeria and Tunis, not only by joining the interests of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Germanism, but also by winning a place in Morocco, opposite Gibraltar, a place in Asia Minor opposite Egypt, and a place in Mesopotamia opposite India." ³³

But Britain, to safeguard her interests in India,

³³ GIBBONS, HERBERT ADAMS: *The New Map of Europe*, p. 59.

kept a watchful eye against all nations, particularly Germany, in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia.

"British opposition to the German schemes (Berlin-Bagdad Railway, etc.) was not limited to the prevention of an outlet of the *Bagdadbahn* at Ko-weit. Since 1798, when the East India Company established a resident at Bagdad to spy upon and endeavour to frustrate the influence of the French, just beginning to penetrate towards India through the ambition of Napoleon to inherit the Empire of Alexander, British interests have not failed to be well looked after in Lower Mesopotamia." ³⁴

Traditional friendship was in existence between Britain and Germany until the latter became her rival:

"The circumstances and conditions that in the relations between Great Britain and France were constantly giving rise to rivalries, disputes, 'pin-pricks' and crises of greater or less acuteness, hardly existed between Great Britain and Germany. . . . The Germans and the British had never been at war, or rather, speaking more accurately, British and German armies had never come into actual conflict. What, then, was there till the last few years to make Englishmen seriously contemplate and prepare for a German war?" ³⁵

The answer to this question was given as early as May 30, 1857, when Otto von Bismarck wrote:

³⁴ *IBID.*, p. 66.

³⁵ ELLIOT, THE HON. ARTHUR: *Traditions of British Statesmanship* (1918), p. 24.

"England cannot look favourably on our chances of maritime development in commerce or in navies, and she is envious of our manufactures." ³⁶

Prince von Bülow has amplified the answer and said:

"The policy of no state in the world is as firmly bound by tradition as that of England, and it is in no small degree to the unbroken continuity of her foreign policy, handed down from century to century, pursuing its aims on definite lines, independent of the change of party government, that England has attained such magnificent success in world politics. . . . The alpha and omega of English policy has been the attainment and maintenance of English naval supremacy. To this aim all other considerations, friendships as well as enmities, have always been subordinated. For the attainment of this one object of English policy, Englishmen have at no time scrupled to use all the means at their disposal." ³⁷

Lord Haldane has given his views on the subject, showing how Britain was forced to make ententes with France and Russia and other powers to secure her own position against the growing naval power of Germany:

"As the navies of Europe were growing, not only those of France and Russia but that of Italy also, we had to look, in the interest of our security, to friendly relations with these countries. We aimed

³⁶ MARCKS, PROF. ERICH: *England and Germany*, p. 49.

³⁷ *IBID.*, p. 44.

at establishing such friendly relations, and our method was to get rid of all causes of friction in Newfoundland, in Egypt, in the East and in the Mediterranean. That was the policy which was implied in our ententes." ³⁸

He further amplifies this point and says:

"On Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's own showing France and Russia would have remained too weak to entertain the hope of success in a conflict with the Triple Alliance, and might have been won on the side of Germany. England would have been in such a case left in isolation in days when isolation ceased to be splendid. For, great as was her navy, it could not have been relied upon to protect her adequately against the combined navies of Germany, France, Russia, and Austria, with that of Italy possibly added. It was the apprehension occasioned by Germany's war-like policy that made it an unavoidable act of prudence to enter the Entente." ³⁹

Germany's growth as an industrial and commercial power ousting Britain from world markets, particularly in the Orient and India, made the Anglo-German rivalry more acute, leading to the conflict of 1914.

"The commerce of the Far East has always been one of the great prizes for which the European nations have struggled, and in this blatantly commercial age Germany could not afford to be left behind.

³⁸ HALDANE, LORD: *Before the War*, pp. 87-88.

³⁹ *IBID.*, pp. 100-101.

Great Britain bestrode two routes, the one around the Cape of Good Hope, the other through the Suez Canal; Russia was established in Central Asia at the gate of India; she was pegging out another route by the Trans-Siberian Railway and her advance in Manchuria. A Germanized Turkey would give the fatherland an outlet to the Persian Gulf, from which steamship lines could carry German influence farther eastward; Persia might be brought under the spell; and even India itself might succumb to Teutonic attraction. . . .”⁴⁰

As early as October, 1901, Lord Haldane in an address in Liverpool pointed out the seriousness of commercial rivalry between Germany and England:

“It is not wonderful that instead of having, as a few years ago we had, the lead of the world in the manufacture of steel, we have fallen behind the United States with their enormous natural resources. But it is startling that we have been beaten in this particular race by Germany. Great Britain regards herself as the leading industrial nation. She has been so long, and until recent times her place has not been seriously disputed. She must continue her commercial output, for it is the foundation on which rests her financial resources, her fleet, her hold on her colonies and dependencies.”⁴¹

He further illustrates the question of Anglo-German commercial rivalry:

⁴⁰ SCHMITT, BERNADOTTE EVERLY: *England and Germany* (1740-1914), p. 264.

⁴¹ HALDANE, LORD RICHARD BURTON: *Education and Empire* (1902), p. 7.

"In 1866 Germany imported over 1000 tons of natural indigo. In 1896 she imported none, but exported 256 tons of the artificially produced article. One of the great natural products of India is in consequence in serious danger." ⁴²

Germany captured a large percentage of Indian trade before the World War, and her place in Indian export and import trade was only second to Great Britain's. This created greater jealousy against Germany. Britain began to talk about Imperial preference to preserve commercial supremacy in India.

As the result of the World War, Germany is no more threatening Britain in the Persian Gulf. She has lost her fleet and colonies, and her commerce is crippled, and she will at least for some time to come not become a serious menace to Britain. Hence Britain is rather anxious to be generous to Germany. There are two other factors which force Britain to be friendly. Britain knows that Anglo-Russian and Anglo-French rivalries are going to influence British world policies; and as Britain made an entente with Russia with the express purpose of lining her up against Germany, so German manpower and efficiency may be a great asset for Britain against any possible eventualities against France and Russia. Whether Germany will agree to ally herself with Britain against France and Russia is not certain, but there is not the least doubt that Britain wants alliance with Germany. Indian states-

⁴² *IBID.*, p. 22.

men should watch Germany, and must not be sentimental but see where they can have common interests with that great nation. An Anglo-German alliance will not be an asset to India's future, but may be a stumbling block to achieving Indian independence.

V

ANGLO-TURKISH RELATIONS AND INDIA

THE land trade-route between Asia and Europe has been the bone of contention between the Powers all along. Professor von Sybel in his study of the Crusades brings out clearly that the political control of these trade routes and the Turkish dominions in Asia Minor had a great deal to do with the European crusades against Islam. These considerations frequently motivated the unctious efforts to free the Christian peoples from Turkish misrule. For whenever peace with Turkey was politically and commercially advantageous, this peace was obtained with absolute disregard for the Christian minorities in Turkey.

"The Porte had been in close alliance with the English ever since the reign of Queen Elizabeth. . . . The alliance of the Porte with France was indeed older than that with England; for a diversion from the side of Turkey had often been a part of French policy in their wars with Austria; and the elder Pitt had, during the mortal struggle of the Seven Years' War, always favoured Russia as against France. Even Fox, in 1783, was deaf to the

proposal of France that she and Great Britain should combine to check the aggressions of Russia upon Turkey, and upon what *remained of Poland*. The alliance of Great Britain and Turkey had in fact been hitherto only a commercial convention, but it was felt that the possession of India made it a very important alliance to the former of the two countries, and that circumstances might arise which would call for a more strictly political alliance.”⁴³

Again: “Throughout the middle of the nineteenth century, British foreign policy was built upon the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan of Turkey was the Khalif of the Mohammedan world. Russia was making great progress in Central Asia. This brought her to the northern and western confines of India and extended her sovereignty over Mohammedan nations. If Russia became the master of Turkey, not only would she have access to the Mediterranean but also she would control the destinies of Islam. The preservation of Britain’s position in India and as a predominant power in the Mohammedan world depended upon checking Russia. British statesmen believed that the political independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire were essential to the British Empire overseas. The Crimean War was fought in this belief, and Russia was menaced with another war in 1877 in pursuance of the same policy. The Treaty of Berlin which super-

⁴³ BURROWS, MONTAGUE: *History of Foreign Policy of Britain* (Revised Edition 1897), pp. 125-126.

seded the Treaty of San Stefano was the work of British statesmen who did not hesitate to sacrifice the Christians under the Turkish yoke for the sake of British interests in India. 'This policy was abandoned because Egypt made no longer necessary its maintenance.'" ⁴⁴

British attitude towards Turkey during the period of the hundred years from the middle of the eighteenth century to the Crimean War has been thus described by John Morley:

"When the war began between Russia and the Porte in 1771 we [the British] supported Russia and helped her to obtain an establishment in the Black Sea. Towards the end of 1782 when Catherine by a sort of royal syllogism, as Fox called it; took the Crimea into her own hands, the Whig cabinet of the hour did not think it necessary to lend Turkey their support, though France and Spain proposed a combination to resist. Then came Pitt. This statesman whose qualities of greatness so profoundly impressed his contemporaries has usually been praised as a minister devoted to peace, and only driven by the French revolution into the long war. His preparations in 1791 for a war with Russia on behalf of the Turks are a serious deduction from this estimate. Happily the alarms of the Baltic trade, and the vigorous reasoning of Fox, produced such an effect upon opinion that Pitt was driven, on the peril of the overthrow of his govern-

⁴⁴ GIBBONS, HERBERT ADAMS: *The New Map of Africa*, pp. 392-393.

ment, to find the best expedient he could to bring the business to an end without extremities. In 1853 (Crimean War) the country was less fortunate than it had been in 1791.”⁴⁵

British pro-Russian policy of the eighteenth century can be explained from the fact that in India Britain found the French and the Moguls as her competitors, and a strong Turkey may be an aid to the Moguls. Pitt's pro-Turkish policy was due to French efforts to have an alliance with Tippu, Sultan in Southern India; and France was trying to secure Russian aid to march towards India through Central Asia. The defeat of France in the great Napoleonic Wars (1815) and the elimination of France from India changed the situation, and again the British attitude became less friendly towards Turkey and more cordial towards Russia:

“In the war between Russia and Turkey in 1828, during the last stage of the struggle for Greek independence, Russia as a Greek champion against the Turk had the English popular support on her side; Palmerston was warmly with her (Russia), regarding even her (Russia's) advance to Constantinople with indifference; and Aberdeen was reproached as a Turkish sympathizer.”⁴⁶

But just as soon as the Russian advance to Central Asia began to be regarded as a menace to British rule in India, the same Palmerston who was pro-Russian in 1828 now supported Turkey and en-

⁴⁵ MORLEY, JOHN: *The Life of Gladstone*, Vol. I, pp. 477-478.

⁴⁶ *IBID.*, p. 480.

tered the Crimean War, and British public sympathy was not for the miserable Christian victims of Turkish misrule but for Turkey.

"Assuming that Palmerston was right in believing that Russia was aiming at an ascendancy in the Near East which threatened British interests in the Mediterranean and India, then the Crimean War can be justified as one waged on behalf of Imperial interests. . . . So far as European politics were concerned, it was India and the position of India as a British possession that dominated the situation. The whole story of our disputes and misunderstanding with Russia has its explanation in British fears of Russian intrigues and movements directed against India." ⁴⁷

"In England the sympathy with the miserable victims of Turkish misrule became modified by the re-awakened jealousy of Russian power (in Central Asia toward India)." ⁴⁸

It is generally believed that the Russo-Turkish War of 1878 was encouraged by Britain. Britain then could afford to have a war between Russia and Turkey so that she might take steps to consolidate her position in Egypt and the Suez Canal, the road to India.

"The purchase of the Khedive's share in the Suez Canal Company (1875) was the first fruit of the new imperialism. . . . Disraeli assumed a serious

⁴⁷ EGERTON, H. E.: *British Foreign Policy in Europe*, pp. 360-361,

⁴⁸ MORLEY, JOHN: *The Life of Gladstone*, Vol. III, p. 569.

responsibility in refusing his assent to the Berlin Memorandum of May, 1876, the object of which was to impose certain reforms on Turkey, to be carried out under European supervision. . . . The Berlin Memorandum in its origin was the work of three empires; but France and Italy adhered to it; and doubtless Great Britain, refusing, helped to stiffen the backs of the Turks and thus to make more probable the outbreak of the war.”⁴⁹

In 1876 Gladstone was advocating the sending of a British navy against the Porte, but when in 1878 the Russians were near Constantinople, Britain voted a credit of six million pounds and sent the navy to the Dardanelles as a threat against Russia.

“The last word of the Eastern Question,” as Lord Derby said in those days, “is this: ‘Who is to have Constantinople?’ No great Power would be willing to see it in the hands of any other great Power, no small Power could hold it at all, and as for joint occupation, all such expedients are both dangerous and doubtful.”⁵⁰

At the Congress of Berlin Britain assumed the rôle of preserving the peace of Europe, but her real interests were guarded through secret treaties both with Russia and Turkey, securing greater control of the Mediterranean, the route to India through the Suez Canal, and the lessening of Turkish prestige in Asia.

⁴⁹ EGERTON, H. E.: *British Foreign Policy in Europe*, pp. 312-313.

⁵⁰ MORLEY, JOHN: *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone*, Vol. II, p. 572.

"Besides the secret agreement with Russia (which agreed to Russian influence up to Northern Bulgaria), the British Government had made a secret convention with Turkey. By this convention England undertook to defend Turkey against Russian aggression in Asia, though concessions were made to Russia that rendered Asiatic Turkey indefensible; and Turkey was to carry out reforms which all sensible men knew to be wholly beyond her power. In payment of this bargain, the Sultan allowed England to occupy and administer Cyprus." ⁵¹

The object and the nature of the secret agreement has been characterized as: "A proceeding by which we [the British] had undertaken, behind the back of Europe and against the Treaty of Paris, to establish a sole protectorate in Asiatic Turkey." ⁵²

After Britain completed her control of the Suez Canal and the occupation of Egypt (so necessary for controlling India), her antipathy against Turkey began to increase.

"Just averse to a joint occupation of Egypt by England and France, as the most perilous of all courses, the London cabinet [Gladstone about 1881] looked to the Sultan as the best instrument for restoring order. Here they were confronted by two insurmountable obstacles: first, the steadfast hostility of France to any form of Turkish intervention and, second, that strong current of antipathy to

⁵¹ MORLEY, JOHN: *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone*, Vol. II, pp. 575-576.

⁵² *IBID.*, p. 577.

the Sultan which had been set flowing over British opinion in the days of Midlothian." ⁵³

Against this policy of making Asiatic Turkey a British protectorate, the Sultan Abdul Hamid started his Pan-Islamic agitation. He also favored the Germans with railroad concessions for the Berlin-Bagdad railroad in opposition to the British railroad scheme from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. This conflict of interests between Britain and Turkey was due to the fact that a rejuvenated Turkey would be a source of trouble for Britain in Egypt and India. So when the Young Turk revolution broke out, Austria broke the Treaty of Berlin by annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina. Britain did not support Turkey in any effective way. Then when the Tripolitan War broke out and Italy annexed Tripoli, Britain supported Italy, hoping to detach the latter from the Triple Alliance by this support and other considerations. Turkey entered the World War against the Triple Entente because she felt that the Anglo-Russian Entente solved the question of Indian security, while the Anglo-French Entente settled the Egyptian and Moroccan problems. Under the circumstances, allied victory stood for Turkish dismemberment. The destruction of Turkey was an asset to the British sovereignty in India provided Russia or any other power would not control Constantinople. The present [November, 1922] British efforts to control Constantinople and the Darda-

⁵³ *IBID.*, Vol., III, p. 74.

nelles is due to her efforts to make the Mediterranean a British lake and to have absolute control of the Indian route.

While the British efforts were directed toward the political weakening of Turkey, in India the question of Turkey has become a part of national agitation. The Khalifat Question and the present Anglo-Turkish discord over the Dardanelles, have been summed up by Prof. Ferdinand Schevill in his monumental work, "The Balkan Peninsula," in the following way:

"For centuries the apple of discord among the ambitious peoples of the earth, and without question the chief prize of the war, the fair city of the Golden Horn, was esteemed as an invaluable treasure by all three victors (Britain, France and Italy). Simply because there was no other way out they at last agreed to set off the city itself, the waters of the Straits, and a narrow strip of shore on either side of the channel, as an international zone under their combined control. Both in peace and war the water-passage was to remain open to the merchantmen and the warships of every nation of the earth. While these pronouncements set forth the great principle of a united world and have an equitable ring, it is plain that the international régime must, in the event of war, redound to the advantage of Great Britain, since by reason of its naval superiority Great Britain can in any crisis always drive its rivals from the sea. In the light of past experience there is no room for doubt that,

when the next war comes, Great Britain will be found using the straits and that, besides herself, no power not on her side and not enjoying her patronage will share this decisive advantage. For this reason the international zone of the Straits is a British solution of the Constantinopolitan problem and neither France nor Italy would have accepted it if they could have discovered any other way out of the tangle. More particularly France has so little stomach for the settlement that it was no sooner agreed on than the Paris Government, first by secret intrigues and latterly by open negotiations, has attempted to supersede and nullify it by restoring the power of the Sultan. Rather than have the British at Constantinople the French are prepared to scrap the whole Treaty of Sèvres." ⁵⁴

Since the defeat of the Greeks by Turkey, and because none of the three Great Powers wants to have the control of the Straits and Constantinople by any one of them, they have agreed that Constantinople and part of Thrace would go back to Turkey. It is quite conceivable that Britain would do her best to win Turkey to her side in the proposed Lausanne Conference, siding with Turkish ambitions, so that French influence be not increasing in the Orient through Franco-Turkish, Franco-Turkish-Italian, or Franco-Turkish-Italian-Russian understandings against Britain, controlling the Med-

⁵⁴ SCHEVILL, FERDINAND: *The Balkan Peninsula and the Near East* (1922), pp. 528-529.

iterranean. Suppose that Anglo-Turkish understanding be a necessity for the maintenance of Britain's position in the Orient and India, and so for the best interests of the Ottoman Empire—there is not the least doubt about a compromise leading to an Anglo-Turkish Entente. In that case what will be the attitude of Turkey regarding India? It is not conceivable that Turkey will go to the aid of India against Britain. In practical politics the interest of the state dominates and there is very little consideration for philanthropy at the cost of a state.

While the British efforts were directed towards the weakening of Turkey, in India the question of Turkey has become a part of national agitation. The Khalifat Question and the movement against dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire were made the issues in Indian agitation against England. At the outset it had some religious significance for the seventy millions of Mohammedans of India anxious to aid their co-religionists in Turkey. But the movement is being supported by the Hindus as well, under the leadership of Gandhi, on account of Britain's breach of faith to the Indian people who fought for Britain and defeated Turkey in the World War.

From the broad point of view of world politics the people of India are justified in aiding Turkey, so that Britain may not relegate such a strategic nation as Turkey into a position of absolute insignif-

icance. But if Indian Mohammedans and Hindus are influenced in aiding Turkey by mere religious sentiment and hatred against Britain, then it is rather dangerous and detrimental to India's own national interest. India's primary interest is the question of national independence and not religious fanaticism or racial antagonism. In the past Turkey has been the friend of Britain and if that suits her interests again, then she may make an alliance with Britain and influence the religious prejudice of Indian Mohammedans towards supporting Britain as an ally of Turkey. Then again, unless India becomes free and independent she cannot aid Turkey or any other nation to the best of her ability. To the Indian Mohammedans and nationalists, who put greater importance on the Khalifat issue than the question of Indian independence, I wish to tell what Enver Pasha, as the Minister of War of the Ottoman Empire, told me:

"The best way an Indian can aid Turkey and the world is by concentrating all efforts on the freedom of India, because without a free India it will be hard for Turkey to maintain her national independence. Above all, every Indian Mohammedan should learn that they have to co-operate with the Hindus as Indians, and that religious fanaticism must be banished from the field of national and international politics, unless the world is to go back to the darkness of the Middle Ages."

This advice of Enver Pasha should be heeded not only by the people of India but all the non-Chris-

tian peoples struggling to attain their independence.

Plainly, Indian international policy must be based upon national interest for the sake of international peace.

VI

THE APPROACHES TO INDIA—THE SUEZ CANAL

BRITISH control of the Suez Canal is one of the cardinal principles of her world policies. This policy is based upon the formula of preservation of the Empire. On the same ground, when the French initiative was aiding the Khedive of Egypt to build the canal, Britain opposed it lest it would be controlled by another nation than herself.

“For fifteen years the British Government had used its influence at Constantinople to prevent the Sultan from sanctioning the project [construction of the Suez Canal under French influence]. In June, 1858, a motion of protest was made in the House of Commons. Lord Palmerston persisted that the scheme was the greatest bubble that was ever imposed upon the credulity and simplicity of the people of this country [England]; the public meetings on its behalf were got up by a pack of foreign projectors; traffic by railway would always beat traffic by steamer through the Canal; it would be a step towards the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire; it would tend to dismember our own empire by opening a passage between the Mediterranean and the

Indian Ocean, which would be at the command of other nations and not at ours. Away, then, with such a sacrifice of the interest of Great Britain to philanthropic schemes and philosophic reveries.”⁵⁵

After 1870 the rivalry between British and French colonial ambitions centred chiefly around the question of domination in Africa. The interest of France in the trade with the Levant and her protectorate in Algeria made her keenly sensitive to anything that related to the North African seaboard. In 1875, Great Britain secured a dominant position in this region through the purchase of shares in the Suez Canal Company. There is no doubt that in this negotiation Disraeli had in mind the prospect of uniting India more closely to England.

Gladstone, describing in 1877 the British Government's position in this matter, stated that the first and fundamental proposition was the preservation of British dominion in the East, and that this was only less important than the preservation of British national independence. He pointed out the following factors which threatened British control of the Mediterranean route to India: “The bare possibility of Russia's obtaining the command of the Bosphorus makes it a matter of urgent necessity that we should secure our route to India . . . the route of which we must be masters, is the route of the Suez Canal. . . . It is held that the Canal must be kept open to our ships at all times and under all circum-

⁵⁵ MORLEY, JOHN: *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone*, Vol. I, pp. 591-2.

stances . . . the command of the Canal involves the occupation of the delta of the Nile. This is called in some passages, the occupation of Egypt.”⁵⁶

In 1880 an English writer, the Hon. Mr. Cowen, in considering the relation of the Suez Canal to India, wrote: “The Suez Canal is the link which unites our eastern and western empires. Through it we not only reach India but our dependencies in the Chinese Seas, our Australian colonies, the Mauritius, and the British settlements on the east coast of Africa. It is the neck which connects the head with the extremities of the empire. . . . We have got the Canal, and in the interest of ourselves and the world we will keep it free from every one at all hazards. If Russia was to obtain political supremacy on either side of the Bosphorus she would stop the Canal or intercept our way to India by the Euphrates valley. . . . This position is the key to Europe—and one of its arteries. Its occupation by conquering ambitions and despotic power would be a danger to England, to Europe and to Liberty.”⁵⁷

Dr. Geffcken says regarding the value of this route: “There can be no doubt that India forms the most vital point in the British Empire beyond the sea; consequently the whole energy of the British statesmen ought to be directed, on the one hand, to securing the north-west frontier threatened by Russia, and on the other, to keeping the way clear

⁵⁶ GLADSTONE, WILLIAM E.: *Aggression on Egypt and Freedom in the East*. Originally published in 19th Century, 1877.

⁵⁷ COWEN: *Foreign Policy of England*, p. 9.

from England to the Peninsula of the Ganges. In former times England grasped in a masterly way the necessity of obtaining solid pillars on which this road is built. . . . Down to the cutting of the Isthmus of the Suez, the only road to India was that around the Cape.”⁵⁸

The great naval authority, Admiral Mahan, summarized the strategic value of Egypt to the British Empire in the following words: “In military situation, Egypt approaches an ideal; for to a local concentration of forces, defensive and offensive, operative in two directions towards Gibraltar or towards India, it adds several streams of supply, so diverse in origin that no one navy can take position to intercept them all. . . . If the Mediterranean be blocked, the Red Sea remains, always the shortest route to India. . . . The truer solution for a state already holding Malta and Gibraltar would seem to be to grasp Egypt firmly, to consolidate local tenure there, and to establish in India, Australia and the Cape sources of necessary supply—whether manufactories or depots—in ammunitions and stores, against the chance of temporary interruption on the side of England.”⁵⁹

In the concluding paragraph of his book, “The Sea Road to the East,” A. C. Sargeant writes: “We have approached India from the north-west, by the passages of the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal; and we have seen how our interests in the

⁵⁸ GEFFECKEN: *The British Empire*. pp. 66-67.

⁵⁹ MAHAN, ADMIRAL A. T.: *The Problem of Asia*, 1900, p. 82.

Mediterranean, at first purely Egyptian, have become more and more related to the control of the seaway to India. South-west is the older route by the way of the Atlantic and the Cape, a route still valuable for some purposes. There the control of the route leads us to the occupation of the neighbouring mainland of Africa. South-east again we reach Australia, either directly across the ocean, or threading the island group of Malays; while the Indian Ocean has its own system of minor local routes. So we have the lines of traffic from every part of the world converging on the Indian region, with its vast trade and swarming population; the natural junction of all these sea roads, great and small, is Colombo, close to the mainland of the Peninsula, yet at the same time well out in the sea, the centre of control from which India reaches out in every direction and dominates the Indian Ocean.”⁶⁰

In his work, “Seaways of the Empire,” Mr. Sargeant writes: “The Suez Canal is an important factor in the Australian traffic while the movement through it to and from the East and South Africa must not be entirely neglected. For the rest of the traffic between Europe, the Indian Ocean and the whole seaboard of Eastern Asia, the Canal is the only route which we need consider.”⁶¹

The important relation of the Canal as the link between Europe and Asia is beyond doubt. The master of that route is to a large extent master of

⁶⁰ SARGEANT, A. C.: *Sea Road to the East*, p. 115.

⁶¹ SARGEANT, A. C.: *Seaways of the Empire*, p. 45.

the political relations between Europe and Asia. Thus it is that today Great Britain is a great Asiatic power. The rise of nationalist sentiment in Egypt has affected great Britain's tenure (in Egypt), which she consolidated in 1882, but today, while she is willing to make concessions to Egypt, she is determined to keep control of the Canal, for purposes of imperial communication, and to safeguard India.

The occupation of Egypt gives a vivid illustration of the fact that all political parties—liberals, conservatives, radicals—are in accord to extend British imperialism.

“ . . . because Egypt was on the road to India, British statesmen were bound to recognize the special claims of Egypt upon their attention and care. If Tory imperialism first bought his shares in the Suez Canal Company from the Khedive, it was liberals of the type of Lord Granville and Gladstone who found themselves compelled most reluctantly to maintain a virtual protectorate over Egypt. There is here no ground for party recriminations . . . But since an Egypt secure from domestic or foreign intrigue was a necessity for British India, British statesmen proceeded gloomily and reluctantly with their inevitable work.”⁶²

Blunt in his “Secret History of the Occupation of Egypt” and in his “Diaries” has proved beyond doubt that Britain wanted to control Egypt for her world imperialism centred in India. Establishment of British protectorate in Egypt sanctioned by

⁶² H. E. EGERTON: *British Foreign Policy in Europe*, p. 361.

the Treaty of Versailles and particularly the United States of America was the natural outcome of the British traditional policy of expansion in violation of agreements, if that be the interest of Great Britain to do.

To pacify the Egyptian people in their revolt against Britain, she has made concessions. But Egyptian independence, under the present situation, is a myth. Britain controls under the present arrangement the finance, army and foreign relations of Egypt. Egypt will never secure her true independence, and Britain will use the might of her empire against Egypt to keep her within the fold, as long as India remains a part of the British Empire. Thus the fate of Egypt is inseparably connected with that of India. Any movement that loosens the hold of Britain in India is a direct aid to Egypt, and the Egyptian nationalists of the Zaglul Pasha type fully realize it; and thus they promise complete co-operation with India on the national basis and not on a religious basis. India should help Egypt to be free because India has helped Britain to subject Egypt, and even today Indian soldiers are in Egypt to preserve British interests there; but let this be understood, that Indo-Egyptian understanding is not, and must under no circumstances be, based on religious fanaticism or co-operations of Indians as love for Islam.

VII

THE APPROACHES TO INDIA—THE PERSIAN GULF

NO better statement of British policy in Persia can be made than that contained in a despatch from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India, in Council, dated September, 1899. " . . . The strategical interests of Great Britain in Persia arise from conditions with which India is most intimately concerned. Long before the boundaries of British India extended to their present limits or before Russia had become a great Central Asian Power approaching or impinging upon many points on the Indian frontiers, the fortunes of Persia, though at that time not a conterminous country, had become a matter of vital concern to the British dominion in India. In the early years of the present century, when the ambitions of France were the main sources of apprehension, it was through Persia that a blow at British supremacy was expected to be struck, and that an invasion of India was planned. The same idea has reappeared at intervals since. Now that the boundaries of Afghanistan, which have been demarcated and guaranteed by Great Britain, march for many hundreds of miles with those of Persia; that Persian territory

is also conterminous for hundreds of miles with Baluchistan, a state under a British protectorate and in large measure actually administered by the officers of the Government of India; and that the sea that washes the southern coasts of Persia is one in which, both from its proximity to the Indian Ocean and as a result of the exertions of the past century, Indian interests and influence have become supreme—it is clear that Persia has assumed a strategical importance, in relation to British India, which might not be serious were the resources or the designs of that country itself alone to be considered; which is indisputably great, when it is remembered that closely pressing upon Persia and Afghanistan is the ever-growing momentum of a power whose interests in Asia are not always in accord with our own, and that the Persian Gulf is beginning to attract the interest of the other and sometimes rival nations. These conditions, however, while they indicate the supreme concern which those who are responsible for the government of India cannot fail to feel in the fortunes of Persia, are nevertheless sufficiently obvious in their general application to render it unnecessary for us to point out their far more than local range, or to argue that they affect not merely the destinies of British dominion in India, but those of the British Empire. . . . Whilst it may be presumed that these pledges [Russian pledges for the integrity of Persia] so frequently renewed, are still in existence, we are not of the opinion that they are in themselves quite sufficient to arrest the centripetal

progress of Russian influence in Persia or to save the Persian kingdom or British interests in it from the erosive agencies that we have described. Within the limits of a nominally still existing integrity and independence many encroachments upon both these attributes are possible so that by almost imperceptible degrees, they pass into the realm of constitutional fiction, where they continue to provide an exercise for the speculations of the jurists long after they have been contemptuously ignored by statesmen. . . . Neither will it be overlooked by Her Majesty's Government, that, while such engagement with Russia might preclude that Power from obtaining control over Central and Southern Persia and in that way reach the Persian Gulf, it would not for one moment retard, might on the contrary accelerate, her advance to the same objective through Mesopotamia by way of Bagdad. . . . We should strongly deprecate the political rivalry of any European Power in the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf, even though such a situation, while fraught with constant annoyance, might not, as in the case of Russia, constitute a positive menace to the Indian Empire." ⁶³

Valentine Chirol, in the preface to his valuable work, "The Middle Eastern Question or Some Political Problems of Indian Defence," relates that he was impressed while journeying through Persia in 1902-3, with the rapidity with which events were moving in the "immutable East." "Under the im-

⁶³ *British Blue Book, Persia*, No. 1, 1908.

pact of western forces," he writes, "the disintegration of Asia is proceeding apace, and new conditions are being evolved which, within a period perhaps no longer very remote, will seriously affect, both directly and indirectly the position of our Indian Empire." ⁶⁴

Throughout the nineteenth century Persia had a threefold interest for England, due to the intrinsic importance of her position as a great Asiatic power, to her potentiality as a valuable ally in case of attack against India, and to the value of the Persian trade, which was largely an Anglo-Indian trade, and therefore intimately connected with interests of British India. Persia dominated geographically the "Middle East," those regions in Asia which extend to the borders of India or command the approaches to India. Chirol, in commenting on the Middle Eastern Question said that it is itself only a part of a much larger question upon which the future of Asia depends. "It is a continuation of the same question with which we have long been familiar in the Near East. It is closely connected with the more novel development of international rivalry in the Far East. It is the outcome of that constant projection of European forces—moral, commercial, and military—into Asia which is slowly but steadily transforming all the conditions that enabled us to achieve, and so far to retain, as the mas-

⁶⁴ CHIROL, VALENTINE: *The Middle Eastern Question or Some Political Problems of Indian Defence*, p. 5.

ters of India, a position of unparalleled ascendancy in the Asiatic Continent.”⁶⁵

Referring to Russia's influence in Persia, Chirol writes at this period (1903): “That question is whether Asia is really a field in which there is room for two of the greatest European powers to fulfil their peaceful mission in friendly competition, or whether their rivalry must ultimately degenerate into a struggle for exclusive mastery.”⁶⁶

He comments further: “But it is necessary also to recognize that the extension of her [Russia's] power has already seriously affected the position of our Indian Empire, and that its further extension might have still graver results. Without going back further than the last two decades, it is obviously the rapid growth of Russia's power in Asia which has alone compelled India to carry out a vast and costly scheme of defensive armaments on her north-west frontier.”⁶⁷

The solution advanced by Sir Valentine Chirol is as follows: “To restore the balance of power in Persia is a practical policy and it is not yet too late to prosecute it with success. But it can be prosecuted with success only by concentrating our efforts within well defined limits. . . . Our commercial and political base is the Persian Gulf. Both politically and commercially it is of the utmost urgency that we

⁶⁵ CHIROL, VALENTINE: *The Middle Eastern Question or Some Political Problems of Indian Defence*, p. 5.

⁶⁶ *IBID.*, p. 18.

⁶⁷ *IBID.*, p. 290.

should open up roads from our base into the interior." ⁶⁸

In his concluding chapter, this keen student of Eastern affairs asks, "How is the position we were able to acquire, and have hitherto held, in Asia by our control of the sea to be upheld under new conditions, in which land-power is tending to become a factor only less essential to its retention than sea-power? India is, and must remain, the key of that position. More than that; it has grown to be, if not the cornerstone of the British Empire, at least one of the chief bases of its security." ⁶⁹

Advocating a vigorous policy in Persia for the protection of British interests in India, he says: "Within the regions where we have no very important material interests to guard, and where the ascendancy of a great military power need not immediately or appreciably react upon the safety of India, we are certainly not called upon to be more Persian than the Persians, or to adopt an attitude of gratuitous opposition to Russia. But in the east and south of Persia there are regions in which the presence of Russia, or, for the matter of that, if it were conceivable, the presence of any other foreign military power, would inevitably constitute a grave potential menace to the peace and security of India. . . . If Russia proved as reasonable as her champions anticipate, a big step would have been taken towards removing the atmosphere of suspi-

⁶⁸ CHIROL, pp. 304-5.

⁶⁹ *IBID.*, p. 394.

cion which, on both sides, at present vitiates our relations with her. . . . The worst of all policies is the policy of drift, for those who take refuge in it invariably end by being its dupes. In China it led us into a mass of embarrassments from which we have not yet extricated ourselves, even with the help of the Japanese alliance. Where, as in Southern and Eastern Persia, the security of India is concerned it might well land us in a national catastrophe.”⁷⁰

On May 5, 1903, Lord Landsdowne made the following declaration: “We, His Majesty’s Government should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by another Power as a very grave menace to British interests, which we should certainly resist with all the means at our disposal.” This policy has been confirmed by Sir Edward Grey and later British Foreign Ministers.⁷¹

The British policy towards the Persian Gulf has been to make it a British lake:

“The disadvantages to Britain in allowing a Russian absorption of Persia are obvious. India would be menaced at the weakest point of her frontier. British trade in Persia—and practically the whole of the carrying trade is under the British flag—would suffer extinction, and the British line of sea communications and the future overland route would be threatened by the establishment of a

⁷⁰ CHIROL, *Ibid.*, p. 308.

⁷¹ *India Year Book* (1921).

Russian naval base, and the presence of the Russian ships in the Persian Gulf. It is indispensable that Britain should retain control of the Gulf. . . . The impossibility of England's opposing Russia in the North with any degree of success, and the supreme importance to England of the command of the Persian Gulf, are now acknowledged. The Persian Gulf is, and should remain a British lake." ⁷²

One authority, writing in this same year, preferred to regard the whole of Persia as the British sphere of influence. He points out that in actual fact the whole of Persia would be, commercially speaking, in the British net, as far as textile manufacturing was concerned, if a British railway were only pushed as far north as Hamadan and Teheran. "The whole aim and object of our policy in Persia first and last should be railways. Russia may have all the political prestige she wants as long as we control the railways from the Gulf to Teheran." ⁷³

In 1907, the Anglo-Russian treaty was made, which divided Persia into three zones, the North being apportioned to Russia, and the South to England, leaving Persia a strip of arid territory in the centre.

He further adds that, if necessary, Persia be partitioned:

⁷² COLQUHOUN, SIR ARCHIBALD: *Russia Against India* (1900), p. 180.

⁷³ WHIGHAM, J. H.: *The Persian Problem*, p. 392.

“Whatever form the future railway system of Persia may take, it is almost a matter of course that the great plateau will be connected with the Gulf and the Indian Ocean by lines running at right angles to the coast. . . . All railways in Lower Persia must be controlled by Great Britain provided always that the Shah’s Government is unable to cope with the task. If this means partition of Persia, then Persia must be divided, unless we are to allow Russia to dominate the whole of the kingdom.”⁷⁴

The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 settled the disputes of these nations in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, the three shields of British India. Professor Seymour admirably sums up the causes which led up to this reversal of the century-old enmity between Russia and England into amity and coöperation. “The sudden and surprising reconciliation of Great Britain and Russia was chiefly facilitated by the attitude of each nation towards Germany. Great Britain was consumed with fear of the economic development of that nation and believed herself threatened directly by its world policy; the same factors that had led to her reconciliation with France made an understanding with Russia. Russia, on the other hand, after seeing her dream of Far Eastern domination shattered, was not grateful to Germany, who was largely responsible for the aggressive policy of Russia in China and Manchuria. Furthermore, the activity of Russia, checked in the Far East, must inevitably be turned towards the Balkans

⁷⁴ *IBID.*, p. 68.

and Constantinople, and in this quarter Russian ambitions conflicted with Germany's purpose of controlling a sweep of territory extending from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf." ⁷⁵

Germany's growing strength as a maritime power had already caused apprehension in British minds. The words that Chatham applied to France, were remembered and applied to Germany. "Our first duty is to see that France does not become a naval, commercial and colonial power." With the development of Germany as a world power, menacing the maritime empire of Great Britain, the policy which had heretofore been directed towards France and Russia, was applied to Germany. Anglo-Russian and Anglo-French relations were adjusted, the latter by the Entente Cordiale of 1904, and the former through the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which in turn became the medium through which the Triple Entente was built up. Concurrently with this diplomatic revolution was carried out the policy of the encirclement of Germany, until in 1914 the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente faced the issue on the field of battle. Not least among the causes leading to this conflict was the question of the Bagdad Railway, or the land route to India.

⁷⁵ SEYMOUR, CHARLES: *The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870-1914*, p. 160.

VIII

THE BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE BERLIN-BAGDAD RAILWAY

THE significance of Anglo-German rivalry which culminated in the World War was foreseen as early as 1903 by that astute writer on Eastern affairs, Valentine Chirol. Under the general heading of "The Balance of Power," he refers to the effect on Britain's imperial interests of the advent of Germany in Asia. He called attention to the fact that it was not only British commercial supremacy that would be challenged if other nations once gained a foothold in the Persian Gulf. He said: "The whole balance of naval and military power in this part of Asia would inevitably be affected, and we should have no Japan upon whom we could call to redress it in our favour." This mention of Japan obviously refers to the Anglo-Japanese agreement of 1902. He continues: "To any one who is at all intimately acquainted with international politics the idea that we could rely upon the appearance of Germany on the scene to act as a counterpoise to Russia must seem quite as futile as that Russia's policy of expansion in Asia can be arrested by graceful con-

cessions. India would be for the first time upwards of a century, exposed to attack from a naval base within close proximity to her shores, and that that is a danger against which she could be protected so long as we preserve our command of the sea, it would mean an additional task for our navy and involve a substantial increase of the naval force permanently stationed in our Indian waters.”⁷⁶

A land-route, a railroad from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf under the British control would be a great asset to British imperial interests. This fact was not ignored by the British statesmen. In fact, the British Government was the first to consider the land route to Asia as the French Government was the first to encourage the Suez Canal project.

“Early in the seventies (1870) a select committee of the House of Commons already had occasion to examine an English project for the construction of a railroad to Asia Minor which was to run from Alexandretta via Aleppo to Koweit; thus connecting the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf. Expert evidence taken at that time showed that this line would render enormous service to the British Empire as a second and more expeditious route to India and as opening access to the untold mineral and agricultural wealth.”⁷⁷

It is interesting to note that Sir Valentine Chirol

⁷⁶ CHIROL, p. 262.

⁷⁷ MARTI, OSCAR A.: *Anglo-German Rivalry as a Cause of the Great War*, p. 66.

quotes the American naval authority, Admiral Mahan, with the greatest respect. Admiral Mahan had pointed out that Great Britain was more than intimately concerned in the fortunes of Turkey and Persia. He laid down three conditions of Britain's future in Asia, conditions "deep struck and closely intertwined in the soil of a past history." "First, her security in India, which would be materially affected by an adverse change in the political control of the Gulf; secondly, the safety of the great sea-route, commercial and military, to India and the Farther East, on which British shipping is still actually the chief traveller, though with a notable diminution that demands national attention; and, thirdly, the economic and commercial welfare of India, which can act politically only through the Empire, a dependence which greatly enhances obligation. The control of the Persian Gulf by a foreign state of considerable naval potentiality, a fleet in being there based upon a strong military port, would reproduce the relations of Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Malta to the Mediterranean. It would flank all the routes to the Farther East, to India, and to Australia, the last two actually internal to the Empire regarded as a political system; and although at present Great Britain unquestionably would check such a fleet, so placed, by a division of her own, it might well require a detachment large enough to affect seriously the general strength of her naval position." ⁷⁸

⁷⁸ CHIROL, p. 264.

The position of the British Government was clearly defined on May, 1903, when Lord Landsdowne declared that "we [*i. e.*, His Majesty's Government] should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other power as a very grave menace to British interests which we should certainly resist with all the means at our disposal."

In 1888 a railway concession in Asia Minor had been granted to a group of Germans, backed by the Deutsche Bank. The first concession was followed by another which extended the railway to Konia. After the second visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II to Constantinople in 1898, another concession was granted in 1899 by the Ottoman Government which contemplated the extension of the railway from Konia to the Persian Gulf. The German financiers applied to the Turkish Government for a *firman*, which was granted in 1903, thus creating the Bagdad Railway Company. The only practical terminus was at Koweit, on the Persian Gulf. In 1899 Colonel Meade, the British resident of the Persian Gulf, signed with the Sheik of Koweit a secret convention which assured to him "special protection" if he would make no concession of territory without the knowledge and consent of the British Government. When a German mission appeared at Koweit in 1900, to arrange the concession for the terminus they were refused. In 1901, a Turkish vessel was sent to Koweit to enforce the authority of the Sublime Porte, but British warships and

British blue-jackets upheld the independence of Koweit.⁷⁹

Failing in obtaining the Persian Gulf terminus, Germany finally secured concessions for a branch line from Aleppo to the Mediterranean, terminating at Alexandretta, and another concession for the construction of a fortified port at Alexandretta. This would give Germany a naval base eight hours from Cyprus and thirty-six hours from the Suez Canal.⁸⁰

In the opinion of Professor Morris Jastrow, "The Bagdad Railway was the largest single contributing factor to the World War."⁸¹

The following quotations are taken from that unique volume, "Entente Diplomacy and the World," by De Siebert and Schreiner. It is composed of the diplomatic documents and correspondence of the Imperial Russian Government, which the writers believed would repose forever in the secret archives of the Governments concerned. Beyond all doubt they reveal the attitudes of the Imperial Russian and British Governments towards the German project of the Bagdad Railway. This particular interchange of correspondence took place in 1909. The British ambassador at St. Petersburg said to Iswolsky (Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs): "My Government is most desirous of learning the conditions under which the Russian

⁷⁹ GIBBONS, HERBERT ADAMS: *The New Map of Europe*, pp. 65-66.

⁸⁰ GIBBONS, *Ibid.*, p. 69.

⁸¹ JASTROW, MORRIS: *The Berlin-Bagdad Railway*, p. 194.

Government would take part in the railway north of Bagdad.

"We have always demanded the control and construction of the line south of Bagdad and cannot content ourselves with less. No doubt can exist that the railway will be built eventually, whether England and Russia take a part or not; and from this point of view England must give serious consideration to the present situation and the Gwinner proposals. But before anything further can be done in the matter Grey would like to have Russia's opinion. There is one reason which makes the question of the southern sector of the railway a most urgent one; the Turkish Government is starting irrigation work south of Bagdad, and it is probable that the rivers will cease to be navigable owing to lack of water. The river-transport of Anglo-Indian commerce, which has been in British hands for more than fifty years, would thus be utterly lost, without any possibility of substitute until the railway is built."⁸²

That the projected railway and the possibility of an Anglo-German agreement was viewed with some apprehension by France is evidenced by the following letter from the Russian ambassador at Constantinople to Iswolsky dated December 8, 1909: "The English communications have made a painful impression on the Paris Cabinet. One naturally

⁸² DE SIEBERT AND SCHREINER: *Entente Diplomacy and the World*, p. 508.

concedes England's fair behaviour in this matter and that she has kept her promise to consider, together with France and Russia, a possible understanding with Germany concerning the Bagdad Railway. But one can read between the lines of the English communication that England is very desirous of accepting the German proposals, although the latter are not at all in keeping with French interests and hardly do justice to ours.

"According to the contents, the projected treaty is of the greatest importance; it is equivalent to the partition of Turkey into a British and a German sphere of interest; England granting Germany freedom of action in Turkey, in Europe and in Asia Minor, and claiming such for herself only in the Turkish territories in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf.

"The French Ambassador is of the opinion that England is more and more concentrating all her energies on the domination of the roads leading to India—the Persian Gulf and the Indian Plains—and England appears to be less and less interested in Constantinople and the Turkish problems proper. The London Cabinet has safeguarded itself by its conventions with Russia against an extension of Russian influence in the Persian Gulf. The projected treaty with Germany completes England's sovereignty in the Persian Gulf. England will then attempt to free herself in Egypt from the obligations to obtain Turkey's sanction in certain politi-

cal and financial matters, and once this end is attained, England will no longer take an active part in the other questions. . . .”⁸³

In 1910 discussion of the Bagdad Railway between Britain and Russia centred around the possibility of linking up the Russian and Indian railways in Persia. The Russian ambassador at London reported to Sazonoff, on December 15, 1910, as follows: “Even if the fear of an invasion of India by Russia has now vanished, yet too close a connection of the Bagdad Railway with the Indian railways through Persia creates no inconsiderable difficulties. A strategical main line, beginning in Turkey, would thus exist: this circumstance must be taken into serious consideration nowadays when Islam appears to be awakening everywhere.”⁸⁴

Apparently in 1914 Britain was still suspicious of Russia's position in Persia. Sazonoff wrote to the Russian ambassador at London on June 25, 1914, as follows: “. . . I had another long conversation, yesterday, with the British ambassador, whose attention I called to the serious danger of a cooling of our relations to England on account of the Persian Question. I assumed that the perturbation and excitement, which had been noticeable of late in England, were most likely to be traced back to the fact that fears as to the position of England in India were once more becoming manifest. Sir

⁸³ DE SIEBERT AND SCHREINER, *Ibid.*, p. 511.

⁸⁴ DE SIEBERT AND SCHREINER, *Ibid.*, p. 527.

George Buchanan conceded that my assumption was for the greater part correct. In consequence, I once more repeated to him all the arguments which prove how unfounded all such fears are, and I even hinted that, should it be desired, we could give to the British Government, and to public opinion there, reassuring declarations in regard to this in the most decisive form.

"I have for the present contented myself with these hints; yet it seems to me quite possible that, later on, in connection with our further negotiations, we might propose to England to give her a guarantee of her Indian possessions, as effective as that given her by Japan in 1902." ⁸⁵

On July 2, 1914, one month before the outbreak of the World War, the Russian ambassador at London replied to the above communication in the following words: "Inasmuch as the security of India is a consequence of the political entente between Russia and England, it follows that public opinion in England, as well as the British Government, in full confidence as to our intentions, have no fears, so long as this entente exists. Should this entente come to an end, there would be a revival of the fear in question. . . .

"This does not, however, preclude the possibility of finding, in connection with certain modifications of our present agreements, a formula which would give expression to the security of India in a still

⁸⁵ DE SIEBERT AND SCHREINER, *Ibid.*, p. 732.

more direct manner; this would merely make our entente still closer." ⁸⁶

It is to be inferred from the general tenor of this correspondence that the "formula" to be sought was a naval convention between Britain and Russia, similar to, and concurrent with, that entered into between Britain and France, the existence of which is admitted in the last letter quoted above, although Sir Edward Grey had denied the existence of such a convention.

It is evident that Russia and Britain before the World War made agreements against the interests of Persia and India. Today Persia is free from Russian control, and Russia is against British imperialism. Persian people should realize that their safety is bound to be menaced as long as India remains under foreign domination. It is not wise either for Persia or India to be less alert regarding their national security, depending upon the altruism of Soviet Russia; because there can never be a permanent guarantee that there will not occur a rapprochement between Britain and Russia protecting their mutual interests in Asia and Europe. Indo-Persian agreement for defensive purposes is the natural thing for the security of these two nations; and this can only be brought about when India and Persia will enjoy full control over their destinies as independent nations.

⁸⁶ DE SIEBERT AND SCHREINER, *Ibid.*, p. 733.

IX

ANGLO-AFGHAN RELATIONS AND INDIA

AFGHANISTAN was once an integral part of the ancient Hindu Empires and was then known as the province of Gandhara. The significance of Afghanistan in British World Politics lies in the fact that it is the only important land approach to India. It was through Afghanistan that India was invaded time and again by various nations. The Persians under the leadership of Darius entered India through Afghanistan and established a satrapy in the Punjab. At the time of Alexander the Great, the Greeks started to conquer India, marching through Afghanistan, and entered the Punjab where they were ultimately defeated by Chandra Gupta, grandfather of Asoka the Great. The history of Pathan and Mogul invasions and the plundering enterprises of Nadir Shah in India have intimate relations with Afghanistan. On the other hand Akbar the Great, the Mogul Emperor of India, realizing the strategic position of Afghanistan, sent his Hindu general, Man Singh, to conquer and control it as an integral part of India.

During the nineteenth century Russian expansion

in Central Asia threatening British control of India created apprehensions among the British authorities; and Afghanistan formed the seat of Russian and British intrigues, each of these powers anxious to secure Afghan support against the other. Lord Roberts in his "Forty-One Years in India" points out that at times British statesmen, Lord Dalhousie and others, thought it wise to remain friendly with Afghanistan and to use her against Russia. As the situation developed unfavourably for Britain, conquest of Afghanistan became the British policy. The first Afghan War of 1838 was undertaken by the British Government to depose Dost Mohammad Khan, the Amir of Afghanistan who had thrown heart and soul into the Russo-Persian Alliance inimical to British interests. Again in 1878, Amir Sher Ali Khan being suspected of intriguing with Russia, British forces attacked Afghanistan and marched to Kabul. On the whole, however, the British policy was to preserve Afghanistan as a buffer state between India and Russia.

Since then British efforts have been directed to making the Amir of Afghanistan subsidiary to Britain with a semblance of independence (something like the Nizam of Hyderabad or at the most, like the King of Nepal) by giving financial aid and exercising diplomatic control. British conquest of Baluchistan, the shutting off of Afghanistan from any sea communication, Britain's friendly relations with Persia and the Russian advance to Central Asia forced Afghanistan, as a matter of self-interest, to

be non-committal and apparently friendly to Britain.

The Anglo-Russian Entente (1907) which was so necessary to the policy of encirclement of Germany led to the understanding that Afghanistan and Tibet and Southern Persia would be within the British sphere of influence, whereas Mongolia and Manchuria and Northern Persia would go to Russia. Article I of the conventions regarding Afghanistan reads as follows:

“Great Britain disclaims any intention of changing the political position of Afghanistan and promises neither to take measures in Afghanistan nor to encourage Afghanistan to threaten Russia. Russia recognizes Afghanistan as outside her sphere of influence, and agrees to act in political relations with Afghanistan through Great Britain and to send no agents to Afghanistan.”

This Anglo-Russian understanding against Afghan independence was never acknowledged as binding by the Amir of Afghanistan, and it made the Afghans feel that they must protect their national independence through close co-operation with other nations. So during the World War Afghan sympathies were with Turkey and the Central Powers and Turko-German military and diplomatic missions were received by the Afghan Government. But the Amir Habbibulla Khan judiciously and persistently refused to attack India at the suggestion of Germany and Turkey because Turkey and Germany were in no position to aid Afghanistan with

military force or arms or ammunitions. It was evident that Afghanistan would not have been able to hold her own against British forces from India and Baluchistan and the Russian forces from Turkestan and Persia.

Since the conclusion of the World War and the fall of Imperial Russia, Afghanistan's military and diplomatic position has been considerably strengthened. Soviet Russia's repudiation of the Anglo-Russian Entente, conclusion of Afghan-Russian pact, and Anglo-Persian misunderstanding made it possible for Afghanistan to take a decided stand against Britain, and favor Turkey in her struggle against Greece. She also expressed in various ways good-will to the people of India in their struggle for independence.

In 1919, alarmed by the Afghan-Russian pact, Britain, in violation of the then existing treaty between Afghanistan and herself, attacked Afghanistan. The adventure was both costly and sanguinary because of the bravery of the Afghans. Britain did not hesitate to adopt the policy of frightfulness and used bombs from aeroplanes on unfortified cities and villages to create panic among the Afghan people. Indian national sympathy was overwhelmingly in favour of Afghanistan and fearing serious revolutionary trouble in India, Britain did not march to Kabul but made an agreement with Afghanistan.

The success of Afghanistan in securing alliances and close friendly understandings with Soviet

Russia, Persia and Turkey, and the recognition accorded to Afghanistan, as an independent power by Germany, Poland, France and other European states have forced Britain to give up the theory of making Afghanistan a dependency. Britain therefore had to recognize Afghanistan as an independent nation, and signed a treaty on November 22, 1921, to that effect. Mr. Hirtzell, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for India has summarized it as follows:

“Satisfactory written assurances having been given by Afghanistan that Russian Consulates—that is, of course propaganda bases—should be excluded from the Indo-Afghan frontier, the way seemed open to fruitful negotiations. . . . The two governments agreed to respect one another’s internal and external independence; to recognize boundaries then existent, subject to slight readjustment near the Khyber; to receive legations at London and Kabul and consular officers at Delhi, Calcutta, Karachi, Bombay, Kandhar and Jalalabad respectively. The Afghan Government is allowed to import free of custom duty such material as is required for the strengthening of their country. So long as the British are assured that the intentions of the Afghans are friendly, this proviso applies to arms and ammunition also. The export of goods to British territory from Afghanistan is permitted, while separate postal and trade conventions are to be concluded in future. Further, each party undertakes to inform the other of major military

operations in the vicinity of the border line.”^{86a}

If Afghanistan actively allies herself with “external forces” opposed to Britain and aids them in a campaign of invasion of India, Britain must fight Afghanistan. The possible combination of France, Russia, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan and other powers marching towards India is haunting British statesmen. The argument often heard against the independence of India is this. She would not be able to defend herself against any such invasion. India can defend herself from any such combination mentioned above if her people are properly armed and trained for national defence. Britain wishes to keep India in subjection at any cost and thus she refuses the Indian people the responsibility of national defence, even refuses the equal opportunity for military training as soldiers and officers. This British policy is responsible for the creation of a school of Indian nationalists who would be willing to combine with external forces to aid them in invading India. They advocate this policy to drive the British quickly out of India. Some of them have made extravagant statements to the effect that the Indian people would be glad to have the Amir of Afghanistan as ruler of India in place of British rule in India, but the real fact is that responsible Indian nationalists are working for a Federated Republic of the United States of India and they have

^{86a} The complete text of the treaty with two “schedules” are to be found as Appendix VII of the *British Blue Book*: Statement exhibiting moral and material progress and condition of India during the year 1921.

no use for any proposition which would lead to even a shadow of any foreign control of India.

Another school of Indian revolutionists looks upon Afghanistan as a strong friendly neighboring power to act as a savior of India. Indo-Afghan coöperation will aid in freeing India. Free India will not have to seek any military aid from any quarter, but many other states will have to court India's friendship. In fact Afghanistan will have to depend upon Indian coöperation and friendship when India becomes free.

There are others in India who like Hon. Aga Khan, advocate the idea of a federation of South Asian States from Burma to Suez in close coöperation with the British Empire. In this plan India will form the centre of the federation with Afghanistan as an integral part. But these are views of a few. Any attempt to develop such a programme may support the false impression spread by such men as Sir Philip Gibbs, that India is trying to co-operate with all the Mohammedan countries of the world against Christian Europe. India is not sympathetic to any such scheme.

An offensive and defensive alliance between the free Federated Republic of the United States of India and the Kingdom of Afghanistan will be of great value to both the countries; but any program even remotely suggestive of Indian imperialism towards Afghanistan or Afghan dictation to India would hurt the vital interests of both nations. At the present juncture the policy of the present

Amir, to aid in Hindu-Muslim unity in India and to cement friendly relations between the people of Afghanistan and India should be so fostered that it may lead to closer political understanding protecting the mutual interests of two absolutely independent nations. Afghanistan will then hold in Asia the enviable position of Switzerland, enjoying peace and freedom.

X

ANGLO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AS INFLUENCED BY INDIA

THE first agreement, concluded in 1902, between Great Britain and Japan purported to be concerned only with English interests in China and Japanese interests in China and Korea. It was a matter of common knowledge that the impelling motive was fear of Russian expansion in Central Asia which had advanced step by step until it threatened Anglo-Japanese interests in the Far East. It has not been so generally known that, as stated in the correspondence discovered in the secret archives of Russia, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance likewise offered secret guarantees for the protection of India from Russian attack.

There was some understanding between Japan and Britain regarding Japan extending military aid to Britain in India against Russian invasion:

"It is fact which is but little known, but which throws a lurid light on the whole future of England in Asia, that during the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese military officer attached to the Commander-in-chief of India, offered formally, but con-

fidentially, to Lord Kitchener one Japanese division of reserve troops for service in India should Russia show any activity on the northwestern frontier.”⁸⁷

In the Anglo-Japanese Alliances signed at London in 1905 and 1911, India is specifically referred to. Two of the three clauses which constitute the preamble to this important treaty deal with India.

Article A.—The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India.

Article C.—The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India and the defence of their special interests in those regions.

Most of the Japanese scholars and statesmen hold that Japan entered the Russo-Japanese War as a matter of life and death for her. Britain did not risk anything by promising support to Japan though she had everything to gain. This view is supported by Mr. Pooley:

“If Japan won, Russia would no longer be dangerous on the Indian frontier, whilst France having put all her funds in Russia, would have to curtail her colonial aspirations. . . . The reward Japan was to reap for success was Korea, and whatever she could screw out of Russia and China in Manchuria.”⁸⁸

⁸⁷ (A quotation from a Staff Officer's Scrap Book by General Sir Ian Hamilton to be found at the footnote of the page 210 of *Japan's Foreign Policy*, by A. M. POOLEY).

⁸⁸ POOLEY, A. M.: *Japan's Foreign Policies*, p. 13.

Today Anglo-Japanese rivalry is very deep; whenever a responsible Japanese merchant or traveller or educator or journalist goes to India he is followed by British spies.

"The growing friendship between the natives of India and the Japanese has furnished another cause of suspicion, not to say irritation on the part of England. It is nothing new that even bona fide Japanese travellers and merchants in India are subjected to espionage by British officials. Not only the Englishmen in India have suspicions of those Japanese likely to come in contact with the radical elements of the Hindu population, but they have shown disposition to exclude Japanese enterprise from the country. . . . When in the summer of 1906, Sir Rabindranath Tagore, India's foremost poet and savant, visited Japan, the Japanese Government, again at England's request, watched him so closely that the distinguished guest made no effort to conceal his disgust." ⁸⁹

Anglo-Japanese relations are not so cordial and the responsible Japanese have reasons to believe that Britain carries on anti-Japanese propaganda secretly and that is not conducive to the existing political understanding between these two powers. Dr. Miyake Setsurei, one of Japan's foremost journalists and sociologists, writing (1916) in the *Nippon-Oyobi-Nipponjin* (Japan and the Japanese) says:

"Japan is desirous of extending her influence in

⁸⁹ KAWAKAMI, K. K.: *Japan in World Politics*, pp. 262-263.

East Asia as much as Great Britain is jealous of maintaining her ground. Impartially speaking, however, it may be considered that the British attitude towards Japan is too nervous and stringent. That Great Britain should strive for maintenance of her interest in the Yangtze valley is not surprising, but it is inexplicable that the British should try to build a parallel line to a proposed Japanese line in China and to induce the Chinese to publish articles that will inflame anti-Japanese feeling among them. . . . Financially speaking, Japan is an insignificant country, in comparison with Great Britain, but in the East she is stronger than any of the European powers. . . . For this reason it will not be advantageous for a country already allied to Japan to sever the bond at the present moment."⁹⁰

This rivalry has economic and political backgrounds, as it was in the case of Anglo-German rivalry. Japan is challenging British commercial and political supremacy in the Far East. This challenge is resented by the British, and they will retaliate at an opportune moment. The sooner Japan and the Japanese people realize it the better it will be for their national safety and for the cause of world peace.

Mr. Pooley voices the sentiment that the British merchants should do their best to preserve their own from the increasing Japanese competition in India and other countries:

"The point which British manufacturers have to

⁹⁰ POOLEY, A. M.: *Japan's Foreign Policy* (1920), pp. 28-29.

consider is to what extent Japan is destined to become a formidable rival of her own in, principally cotton goods, iron and steel products and in shipping. . . . In particular, for political as well as economic reasons we ought to make every effort to restore our position in India, in the Straits and in Australia.”⁹¹

Mr. Ellis Barker sees that the root of Anglo-Japanese rivalry lies in the struggle for the control of the trade of Asia, and particularly, the trade of India. He presents the following facts. “The development of Japan’s export trade in the Far East has been amazing. During the decade of 1904–1913 her exports to China have trebled, and so have her exports to British India. Between 1904 and 1917, Japan’s exports to China have grown sixfold and those to India tenfold. . . . The vast development which the Japanese industries have secured during the struggle [the World War] will before long, no doubt, affect the commercial position in the Far East, for Japan may be expected to concentrate her energies once more upon the gigantic markets of Asia. . . . Great Britain is strongly, one might say vitally, interested in the Asiatic markets, and especially in the Indian market, which is by far the most important market of Lancashire. India takes the bulk of British cottons. Now it must be remembered that the cotton industry has become the most important industry of Japan. . . . Japan after having completed the

⁹¹ POOLEY, A. M.: *Foreign Policy of Japan*, p. 195.

economic conquest of China, may begin and complete the economic conquest of India. That would be Lancaster's ruin, for the bulk of Lancaster's manufactures are sold in that country. It is only reasonable that Japan strives to dominate with her manufactures the Chinese market, but it is equally reasonable that the Indian market should be reserved to the inhabitants of the Empire."⁹²

In spite of the profession of friendship by the British officials, British people are antagonistic to Japan and that is quite clear to those who have visited the Far East where the Japanese political and economic influence is challenging that of Britain. Typical expression of British attitude towards Japan is clear in the following passage written by an eminent British publicist as late as 1919:

"This [Japanese] challenge to the world's decency however can no longer be disregarded; it must be taken up, since imperialist Germany cannot be considered properly crushed until her copied methods have been eradicated from the Far East. . . . For it is force that is behind the Japanese program—not equity or justice, but force mixed with corruption. This force is today semi-anti-quated; for the Japanese armaments are much where they were after the Russo-Japanese War, are totally unequal to the challenge offered to first-class maritime Powers with great interests to protect in the Far East. . . . Grey battle-ships on the horizon line would bring home to Japanese leaders

⁹² BARKER, ELLIS: *Economic Statesmanship*, pp. 434-442.

what all the butchery of the war has failed to teach; too long have the waters of the Yellow Sea been without adequate protection. . . . If there is justice enough left over after Europe has settled her own troubles, Eastern Asia is surely the first claimant. Unless that precious quality is used in abundance, the day is not far distant when the crash will come and men must fight again." ⁹³

Some Japanese publicists and statesmen think that the Japanese people will not be disposed to aid Britain in putting down Indian aspirations for national independence. Kawakami states, "The provision of the existing treaty of alliance as to Japan's duty with regard to India is not clear. Suppose India rose in rebellion while England's hands were full in Europe: would Japan be required to quell the insurrection in virtue of the alliance? Japan would undoubtedly prefer British rule for India to German or Russian domination, if the country had to be dominated by some European power; but the point is that she would be reluctant to take part in crushing the just aspiration of the Hindus for independence and freedom." ⁹⁴

Although the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1911 was automatically continued in 1921 after careful consideration by the British Government, the real reason was not any special consideration for Japan, but fear that Japan's policy might be antagonistic

⁹³ WEALE, B. L. PUTNAM: *Truth About China and Japan*, pp. 151-154.

⁹⁴ KAWAKAMI, K. K.: *Japan in World Politics*, p. 264.

to British occupation in India. An Oriental student of Eastern foreign relations confirms the theory that should Britain discontinue the alliance (which is now superseded by the Four Power Pact), she would be confronted with Japanese resentment, and this resentment "would surely manifest itself in hostile fomentation of rebellions in India and Egypt and other territories, if not in entering into alliance with the enemies of Great Britain."⁹⁵

It is only a question of time when Japanese statesmen will recognize that a free India will be of greater benefit to Japanese interests and may serve as a source of strength and security to Japan, creating a new balance of power in Asia and world politics in general.

⁹⁵ BAU, M. J.: *The Foreign Relations of China*, p. 146.

XI

ANGLO-CHINESE RELATIONS AS INFLUENCED BY INDIA

ANGLO-CHINESE relations have been intimately connected with the history of British India. In 1792 a special embassy was sent to Peking on behalf of the East India Company, under the leadership of Earl Macartney. The specific object of this mission was to open up Chinese ports to British trade, but no success was achieved at this time.

An early precedent for the invasion of the territorial integrity of China occurred in 1802, and it is significant that this was done by order of Lord Wellesley, Governor-General of India. Macao was occupied for the purpose of protecting that port, on behalf of Portugal, against a possible French attack.

Chong Su See, in his work "Foreign Trade of China," relates: "The Chinese rightly remonstrated against this forcible possession of their territory, and demanded that the troops depart promptly, at the same time making it absolutely clear that Macao was an integral part of the Celestial Empire, and that the Portuguese were allowed

to remain in the place merely as tenants at will, paying an annual rental to the Chinese Government. Happily, news of the Peace of Amiens soon reached China, and the troops withdrew.”⁹⁶

Six years later, by order of another Governor-General of India, Lord Minto, another invasion of China took place, when a detachment of soldiers was sent to Macao. It is further related by Dr. Chong Su See that the court of Directors of the East India Company maintained that no apprehension need be entertained of embarrassment from the Chinese Government, if permission were obtained from the Portuguese for that purpose. The Chinese remonstrance was unheeded, and when they suspended trade and denied provisions to the British ships the British admiral, Drury, refused to disembark his men and informed the Chinese officials that his instructions had not forbidden him to declare war against the Chinese nation if necessary. When he attempted to force his way to Canton, he was met with armed resistance, and desisted from the attempt.

Another expedition which set out from England in 1816 likewise was unsuccessful, for the Chinese were alarmed by the British expansion in India, where the British had subdued Nepal, a feudatory of China.

The Opium War of 1840, and the so-called Opium War of 1856, were waged against China by

⁹⁶ CHONG SU SEE: *The Foreign Trade of China*, p. 74.

Great Britain for the purpose not only of securing territorial and port concession but of maintaining the opium trade because of its profit to the British East India Company.

Discussing Anglo-Chinese relations, Dr. M. J. Bau shows that British encroachments on Chinese territories were directed from the side of India, and were influenced by considerations of Indian policy. He quotes the statement of Bonar Law made in the House of Commons on November 27, 1911, who, while disclaiming that Britain has any desire for territorial acquisitions, stated that there was one limitation on this principle. "There are certain places," he said, "lying next to British possessions or perhaps strategically commanding important British routes" which Great Britain could not see pass into other hands.

Pursuing this policy Great Britain seized Burma and Sikkim during the period when China was suffering the loss of her dependencies to various European nations, and at a later period she extended her influence over Tibet. In 1904 she entered into a treaty with Tibet which stipulated that British consent was to be obtained before any territorial concessions were made to any other power. In 1906 she signed a treaty with China in which she promised not to annex Tibetan territory; but by 1915, when she realized that Russia had established a joint sovereignty over Mongolia, she demanded similar privileges in Tibet. This extension of

British power at the expense of China has added immeasurably to the resources and wealth of the British Empire.

Sir Francis Younghusband in his work "Tibet and India" has given the full text of the Anglo-Tibetan Convention, and we quote Article IX, which throws light on the British policy towards China leading to annexation of Tibet, a province which in resources is equal to Mexico:

"The Government of Tibet engages that without the previous consent of the British Government:

"(a) No portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation to any foreign Power.

"(b) No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs.

"(c) No representative or agent of a Foreign Power shall be admitted to Tibet.

"(d) No concession for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power or to the subject of any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government.

"(e) No Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign Power." ⁹⁷

⁹⁷ YOUNGHUSBAND, SIR FRANCIS: *Tibet and India*, pp. 441-443.

These demands certainly beat the so-called Twenty-one Demands of Japan to China, and Sir Francis explains that Britain had to take this step to protect India from Russian aggression through Tibet.

China has suffered a good deal at the hands of the British nation. The encroachments on China were directed from India and inspired by the purpose of strengthening the British hold on India. Land and sea-routes between Suez and Hong Kong must be under British control.

Britain is working for the realm between Suez and South China, although it is not apparent to ordinary observers. The following extracts from the eminent British statesman, geographer and gold-medallist of the British Royal Geographical Society, Sir Archibald Colquhoun, in his various works, will give some light on the subject:

“In order to defend her Asiatic interests, Europe [really England] can no longer depend exclusively on the Suez Canal line of communication. She needs also a more fully developed overland route—a railway line through Mesopotamia—and this not only for political but for commercial reasons. . . . By developing these regions, Europe would be merely advancing her commercial interests; for this purpose, almost as much as for the political reasons, it is necessary to combat Russian policy. Between the Mediterranean and the Indian frontier, lawlessness and oppression at present prevail; and

the introduction of a more *civilized control* is a necessity of the age, and would be welcome at large. . . .”⁹⁸

He further adds:

“When Russia is extending her lines from the Caspian to Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, and through China to the Yangtze valley, Britain cannot afford to sit still looking always for immediate results. She should reply by a direct overland line from Quetta to Seistan and thence via Kerman to Ispahan, Mosul and onward with branches.”⁹⁹

Regarding Britain’s policy of controlling southwestern China to safeguard her hold in India, he says:

“And what will be the effect if this process be continued until one day Russia is mistress of China, as well as paramount in Afghanistan and Persia? On the northeastern frontier Britain can only defend India by introducing a counterbalance in China itself, by developing the Yangtze basin, which contains the greater part of the resources of the Empire and half its population, and by controlling Southwestern China, where lies the access to Burma and through Burma to India. This would afford Britain a proper base and line of defence on the Upper Yangtze which, combined with her sea-power and the control of the great Chinese waterway, would enable her to hold her own.”¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ COLQUHOUN, SIR ARCHIBALD: *Russia Against India*, p. 227.

⁹⁹ COLQUHOUN, SIR ARCHIBALD: *Ibid.*, p. 225.

¹⁰⁰ COLQUHOUN, SIR ARCHIBALD: *Overland to China*, pp. 458-459.

To insure Great Britain's virtual control over the region from Suez to Southwestern China, she has carried out a ruthless policy of subjugation against any nation, European, Asian, or African, which stood in her way. So far she has been successful, and invariably her success has been due to her command of India's man-power, her raw materials, and her strategic position. India has been instrumental in bringing sorrow and distress to Persia, Egypt, Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Tibet, Burma, Siam, China, Arabia, Turkey, and Mesopotamia. It is India's duty to help these nations in their struggle against imperialism as well as strive to throw off her own bonds.

In terms of past history and mutual interest, India has many reasons for regarding China with sympathy and friendship. Indo-Chinese understanding for mutual security will eliminate all fears of Russian, British, Japanese, Turkish or any other imperialism, and its aggression against China and India.

XII

ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND INDIA

FAR-SIGHTED British statesmanship has long ago perceived that an Anglo-American Alliance is a great necessity for the preservation of the British Empire. Gordon Le Suer and Basil Williams in their works on Cecil Rhodes show that one of the political ideas which inspired him to establish the Rhodes Foundation was to bring about the political union of England and the United States of America. Andrew Carnegie, William T. Stead and others worked for the same purpose. Chamberlain, Balfour, Bryce and others are the exponents of the same idea. In America Choate, Mahan, Page, Root, Wilson, Lodge, Harvey, Hoover, Beck and innumerable lesser lights are working for the same end. The Sulgrave Institute of England and the Loyal Coalition of Boston and other organizations and foundations are busy influencing public sentiment in America toward closer union with England. England is convinced that the safety of the Empire will be very much jeopardized, if not endangered, if America be hostile to Britain's international policies. This feeling has become stronger since the

World War. They all realize including Mr. Kipling, who derides America, that America saved the British Empire in 1917.

The argument they put forward for an Anglo-American Alliance can be summed up by the following brilliant quotations from eminent British writers:

"Far more immediately hopeful is the prospect that 'greater Britain' in the sense that Sir Charles Dilke first used the words—men of British origin at home or abroad, in all parts of the world where they have settled, ever growing in numbers and importance, as compared with the nations of Europe—will in future weigh the scales heavily in favor of world peace. The British Empire and the United States are the two great divisions of that people. If they can work together in hearty and perpetual alliance, there will be a greater safeguard for peace than the world has yet seen." ¹⁰¹

Mr. Ellis Barker says:

"The hope to secure the peace of the world by arbitration treaties or by some great international organization, such as a federation or a great league of nations, may prove an illusion. All attempts to eliminate war by mutual agreement among states have failed since the time when the Greek states created the Amphictyonic League. All efforts to link together the satisfied and land-hungry nations to combine them for the defence of the territorial status quo may prove futile. The peace of

¹⁰¹ ELLIOT: *Traditions of British Statesmanship*, p. 214.

the world can easily be maintained not by creating an artificial and unnatural partnership which will break down at the first opportunity, but by creating a permanent partnership between the freedom-loving Anglo-Saxon nations which in addition have the advantage of belonging to the same race, of speaking the same language, of having the same ideals, the same laws and the same traditions. A British-American union devised for the protection of their possessions against foreign attack should be the most powerful instrument imaginable not only for protecting the future peace of the Anglo-Saxons but also for protecting the peace of the world." ¹⁰²

Mr. A. G. Gardiner argues that an Anglo-American combination makes America and Britain the supreme arbiters in world affairs:

"They have the world at their feet. It will be what they choose to make it. Between them they rule, directly or indirectly, not much less than half the earth. They command practically the whole of the credit left in the world. Their supremacy in mere terms of force is unassailable. Their command of the sea is not merely complete: it is without the shadow of a challenge. They have the unequalled potentiality of great armies. They possess the major part of the raw materials of the general life—wool, cotton, coal, iron, food. They represent, both mentally and physically, the high-

¹⁰² BARKER, J. ELLIS: *Greater Problems of British Statesmanship* (1917), p. 431.

est standard of human efficiency extant. They possess the two greatest power-houses in the world. There is no other nation that approximates to their industrial capacity, more even than numbers in the field the determining factor in modern warfare. Above all, the power of these two great commonwealths is realized power. It is not power (as in the case of Russia) which is latent and may be developed in a generation or generations. It is in being, actual, instant. It dominates the globe.

"And it is not an extravagance to say that the capital problem of mankind is whether this domination is to be exercised in rivalry or in well-being of the world, or for selfish aggrandizement of the respective nations."¹⁰³

In spite of these various reasons advanced by British statesmen, unless Anglo-American political and commercial rivalries are eliminated frictions leading to conflict are bound to arise. British statesmen are anxious to have Anglo-American friendship, but they are not at all desirous to surrender British supremacy in world affairs.

"The British people in their dominions and colonies own by far the greatest estate in the world. The national resources of the British Empire are infinitely greater than those of the United States. National power is based upon national wealth. Production, wealth, population, economic policy will decide whether the United States or the British Empire will become the leading Anglo-Saxon Power.

¹⁰³ GARDINER, A. G.: *The Anglo-American Future* (1920), p. 12.

. . . An inventory of the resources of the British Empire and an imperial conservation movement is required. The conservation of the imperial natural resources is well worth a special conference. The undiminished possession of the vast natural resources of the British Empire must be safeguarded to the future greatness of the Anglo-Saxon race." ¹⁰⁴

The questions of debts, naval competition, shipping competition, control of the trade-routes, raw materials, and markets of the world, and the question of unrestricted and equal opportunity of investing capital in British protectorates—all these afford causes of friction. So far the question of naval superiority has been temporarily solved by America's surrendering to Britain's claim at least for ten years. The question of the payment of debts has already created some animosity among the masses of the two nations. A shipping war is going on, and the United States Shipping Board is not willing to surrender America's mercantile strength; and if a ship-subsidy bill be passed in America, it will tend to increase friction in this field. Regarding the control of raw materials and markets, there is a good deal of ill-feeling between America and Britain because the latter has succeeded in excluding America from many important sections of the world where oil is abundant, in Mesopotamia, New Guinea, etc. The question of commercial monopoly by Britain in territories like the island of Nauru has created quite an unfriendly

¹⁰⁴ BARKER, J. ELLIS: *Economic Statesmanship*, pp. 398-399.

feeling among certain classes of American business men. America is financially the strongest nation in the world, and she is every day becoming more of an exporting nation. She wants equal opportunity for securing raw materials, selling finished products, and room for foreign investments. Will the competitive capitalism of Britain and America quarrel? The cause of misunderstanding between Britain and America will be accentuated if Britain tries to practise all over her territories the doctrine of imperial preference. The question of imperial preference in India is being agitated and advocated by Britain, and in this connection will India secure a good deal of attention in the international outlook of America.

American political philosophy, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence, the greatest of political documents, is influencing India's struggle for freedom, as it has served as an impetus to establish a republic in China. America will find in India a friend of immense potential strength. But if an Anglo-American Alliance be the guiding principle of American international policy, is she then prepared to go to war to uphold British imperialism? All Asia and such European nations as are suffering from British world domination will not look favourably on the proposed Anglo-American Alliance.

America, true to her traditions of a "government of the people, by the people, and for the people," should not under any circumstances ally herself with a nation keeping hundreds of millions under subjection.

XIII

INDIA AND BRITISH MILITARISM

THE British Empire as constituted, scattered all over the world, must rely on naval and military force. Sir John Seeley says: "We found that the Government [of British India] did not rest, as in England, upon the consent of the people or of some native constituency which has created the government by a constitutional process. . . . There is only one body of persons of which we can positively affirm that without its support the government could not stand; this is the army."¹⁰⁵

India is kept under subjection through two forces: (1) Britain's ability to utilize India's man power and resources against India, and (2) Britain's ability to use the world's political forces in her favour through a series of alliances and understandings with other nations. To offset the first weapon used by Britain against Indian aspirations has been applied the Progressive-Non-Co-operation movement in India. To offset and overcome the second means India needs to establish foreign relations of her own.

¹⁰⁵ SEELEY, SIR JOHN: *The Expansion of England*, p. 318.

In this connection let it be clearly understood that one of the causes of failure in the struggle for independence of India in 1857 was the lack of foreign relations with various nations, such as Italy established during her struggle for independence. Though Azimullah Khan was in Turkey and Russia, and the understanding was that Persia would aid India, the aid did not come. Britain succeeded in securing Turkey's aid by playing the game of the Russian bogey during the Crimean War. In fact, it was the fear that Russia might thrust herself into India which induced Britain to enter the Crimean War on the side of Turkey. England influenced Turkey to such an extent that the Sultan issued a *firman* asking the Mohammedans of India, particularly the Nizam of Hyderabad, to aid Britain. This was very effective. Russia and Persia could not extend any aid to India because they were afraid of Turkey, supported by the European concert of Britain, France, Italy, and other nations.

In this connection it may be mentioned that during the European War the Indian revolutionists did their best to establish foreign relations with various states of the world, as Benjamin Franklin and others tried to do on behalf of revolutionary America on the eve of the establishment of the United States of America. These very activities of the Indian revolutionists were probably the most important factors for Mr. Montagu's sanctioning so-called reforms. Lord Morley in his "Recollections" (Vol. II) makes it clear that he started the

scheme of "rallying the moderates" by the Morley-Minto reform plan after the Indian revolutionary movement took a terroristic turn.

Regarding the rise of nationalist agitation for independence (1905) of India Viscount Morley says :

"It was among the students in parts of India that unrest specially prevails. That class was rapidly being drawn into something like a spirit of revolt against the British Government, and the movement was unmistakably coming to a head notably in Upper India. A feeling gained ground that the last twenty years have been a period of reaction and in combative repose, the idea of complete independence of England began to appeal to youthful imagination. This marked the line of cleavage between moderate and extremist in native party of reform . . . the political changes within the last dozen years were enormous, and though the mass of the people remained ignorant and unmoved, it would be a fatal mistake to suppose that the change was confined to the preachings of political agitators. The fairly educated Indians were thoroughly dissatisfied with the old order of things. The victories of Japan, the revolutionary movement in Turkey, China, Persia did not pass unobserved. A new and ominous suspicion that England had come to a stop in her liberating mission made way. . . ." ¹⁰⁶

The real motive of granting some reforms in India was not to give the people freedom, but to

¹⁰⁶ MORLEY, VISCOUNT JOHN: *Recollections* (Vol. II), p. 154.

keep the moderates with the Government. Lord Morley says:

"In the first place it will tend to reconcile liberal opinion (not in party sense), here, and that is something. In the second place, it will make it easier for the Moderates to resist the Extremist attack. Such an attack is sure to come and it is our business, as I think, not to do anything, that will give substance to Extremist taunts and reproach against their moderate opponents."¹⁰⁷

Today the majority of Indian nationalists under the unique leadership of Mahatma M. K. Gandhi are advocating non-violent non-coöperation to achieve Swaraj or Self-Rule. Today there is no Germany challenging British world supremacy; neither France, Russia nor any other power is in a position to attack India successfully, and Japan is Britain's ally in the Orient. Yet Britain is piling up military expenditure in India, as General Rawlinson, the commander-in-chief of British forces plainly says, to avert a general national uprising. Thus India is facing the struggle against British militarism.

Taxation without representation is found in India. The English Government in India has increased the military expenditure, at the dictation of General Rawlinson, despite the opposition of the Indians in the so-called legislative council. The Indian members have nothing to say about the military expenditure of the land. The military expend-

¹⁰⁷ *IBID.*, p. 260.

iture of India is much more than double the naval and military expenditure of Japan.^{107a} It is over fifty per cent. of the revenue of the land. It has been increased from \$225,000,000 to over \$300,000,000, which means the total annual income of 30,000,000 starving people of India.

During the year 1921-1922 about 40,000 persons were arrested because of their political agitation. Under the administration of Lord Reading, even though a member of a suffering race, he is carrying out the British imperialistic policy with greater sternness than any other British administrator. Britain is using Jewish intellects to govern the Orient. Readings, Montagues, Samuels are the leading lights of Zionism. Imperialistic designs of Great Britain must be successfully checked before India can be free. It is a matter of time when the whole world will wake up to the menace of British militarism, and India should take the lead to rouse the international conscience.

Britain's militarism, navalism and her determination to dominate the world depend upon her ability to utilize other powers to further her interest. This is British diplomacy. British diplomacy is at the zenith of its success. Today America, Japan, and all Europe are aiding British militarism positively and by indirect means under the guise of

^{107a} India's military expenditure for the year 1921-1922, according to *The Statesman's Year Book*, 1922, is 663,110,000 rupees or 331,550,000 yen. According to the same authority, Japan's naval expenditure for the same period was 60,842,000 yen, and military expenditure 93,989,000 yen, a total of 154,831,000 yen.

serving their own interest and preserving world peace. America is leaning to a pro-British policy, which may lead to an Anglo-American alliance or understanding. In the debate regarding the Four Power Treaty, Senator Borah pointed out the possibilities and consequences of the Anglo-American Alliance. So far as the Pacific is concerned, Japan and France are bound to support Britain by the so-called Four Power Pact. Germany and Italy are playing into the hands of Britain because of the fear of French imperialism. Russia is catering to British diplomacy to bring France to terms. In spite of much talk of radicalism, of Soviet diplomacy, Russia is more occupied in preserving the Anglo-Russian trade agreement. Britain thus has made the Baltic and the Mediterranean British lakes. There is a good prospect for an Anglo-German-Russian-Japanese-American understanding to crown the success of British diplomacy and to strengthen British world domination through her navalism, militarism, and air forces. This is the real world menace which is facing the world, particularly Asia and India. This is the real nature of British peril which India will have to fight, unless something happens to defeat British diplomacy.

Europe of today is more or less a vassal to Britain and she will remain so until the continental European statesmen pay heed to the sound policy once outlined by the great Russian statesman, Count Witte, in his "Memoirs," to the effect that friendly understanding must be brought about between

France and Germany through the good offices of Russia, which must not be a tool of Britain. Then there will arise a Continental *bloc* ¹⁰⁸ of Russia, Germany and France which will draw in Italy and Spain, for no other purpose than to check the British policy of keeping Continental Europe divided to further Britain's imperial designs.

This will bring comparative peace in Europe and this will force Japan to give up her relations with Britain; and America will not favor an Anglo-American Alliance against the whole world to uphold British imperialism in Europe, Asia and Africa. The Indian statesmen, conscious of the ultimate fight between British militarism and navalism and the rising democracy in India, should interest themselves to bring about active coöperation with those European and other statesmen who are not anxious to subscribe to the ideal of world peace under British domination.

¹⁰⁸ Count Witte said to Ex-Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany:—"Your Majesty, picture a Europe which does not waste most of its blood and treasure on competition between individual countries, which does not maintain millions of soldiers for internecine wars, which is not an armed camp with each country pitted against its neighbour, a Europe which is in brief one body-politic one large empire. Then of course we would be richer, and more vigorous, more cultured and Europe, instead of withering under the burden of strife, would become truly the mistress of the world. To achieve this ideal, we must seek to create a solid union of Russia, Germany and France. Once those countries are firmly united, all the other states of the European continent will no doubt join the central alliance and thus form an all-embracing continental confederation, which will free Europe from the burden of internecine competition and establish its domination over the world for many years to come."

—Yarmolinsky, Abraham: *The Memoirs of Count Witte*, p. 409.

XIV

RECENT ASPECTS OF BRITAIN'S INDIAN POLICY

THE British policy of the retention of India and British possession of all approaches to India was written into the Treaty of Peace with Germany at the conclusion of the World War. For the security of India she made a protectorate of Egypt, secured mandates in Palestine, Arabia and Mesopotamia, and created the state of the Hedjaz.

During the Anglo-French controversy which arose out of circumstances attendant on the Washington Conference, Earl Curzon stated that Britain must not allow any nation to be supreme in the Middle East, and thus jeopardize the control of the route to India.

The Washington Conference was likewise influenced by considerations arising out of Britain's interest in India. Britain desired the support of the United States and Japan and, if possible, of France in supporting her Asian Empire. On the other hand, she would have been apprehensive of an alliance between France and Japan, because such a combination linked up with the nationalist movement in India would create very serious difficulties

for Britain. The Four Power Pact safeguards the British position in the Orient no less satisfactorily than did the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which it supercedes. The Rt. Hon. Srinivas Sastri, an agent of the British Government, representing the British in India, was brought to Washington as a symbol of Indian participation in the Conference in an official manner.

The Anglo-French ill-feeling at the Washington Conference was due in part to Britain's firm stand against France's Oriental Policy, which is very prejudicial to British interests. France supported the Kemalist Government against Greece, the tool of Britain. Britain wants to weaken Turkey, whereas France is in favour of maintaining Turkey in Asia Minor as it is clear that behind the expansion of Greece lay the British design to dominate the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Britain desires no nation challenging her position between the Suez Canal and India.

Anglo-French relations became strained when France demanded a navy equal to that of Japan. In a secret session Mr. Balfour opposed France's demand and spoke in unmistakable terms. He pointed out that if France wished to have a navy equal to that of Japan, Great Britain would support Italy. In that case the combined naval forces of France and Italy would be superior to those of Great Britain in the Mediterranean, and thus endanger Britain's control of the sea-route to India via the Suez Canal. Britain's opposition to a large

submarine tonnage was dictated in part by apprehension of the damage that this type of vessel could inflict, endangering the route to India.

It was for the sake of Indian security that Britain made a compromise with Ireland. It is because of India that Britain has given so much consideration to Egypt. It is the question of imperial interests in India that caused Britain to strive for an understanding with Afghanistan. It is because of India that Britain shows an apparently conciliatory spirit towards the Arabs, at the same time establishing military air routes from Alexandria to Karachi. It is to strengthen her position in India that Britain has taken Tibet within her fold and is continually encroaching in Southern China and the Malayan Peninsula, by building impregnable naval bases, particularly at Singapore.

Before making a trade agreement with Soviet Russia, Britain extracted a promise from her that there would be no Russian menace, direct, or indirect, to India. As one of the conditions of British recognition of Soviet Russia at the Genoa Conference, Britain demanded that Russia should not distribute propaganda material in India. It is with India in mind that Britain is talking of certain revisions in the Treaty of Sèvres, on the theory that the Bosphorus will remain in her control, and that there will be no Russian menace through a Russo-Turkish, or Russo-Turkish-French understanding. The recent treaty of Rappallo was most disquieting, for it brings on the stage of world politics a poten-

tial land force, the greatest of modern history, to oppose Britain's sea power. The drama may be fought out in Central Asia.

The nations of the world who have relations with Britain's world policies are watching India's march towards her absolute independence, for a free India would mean, not only a change in the map of Asia, but a change in the political map of Europe.

While some of the Indian statesmen continue to think and work in terms of India within the Empire of Great Britain, independent nations are not interested in aiding India to achieve the status of a dominion. No nation which fears British world supremacy would care to aid any movement in India which is directed towards strengthening the British imperial system, through the establishment of a self-governing dominion in India.

Free from British control, India would have remarkable possibilities of economic development. In discussing the coal and iron situation in the world, Mr. Ellis Barker states that India has more iron resources than China and it may be that they are equal to those of all other countries of Asia. It is needless to emphasize that an India with coal resources of no less than 79,000,000,000 tons and with actual reserves of iron amounting to 65,000,000 tons and potential reserves of 250,000,000 tons as estimated by Mr. Barker, is of great interest to industrial countries. A free India would mean commercial possibilities in a land which is now practically controlled by a British monopoly.

The nations which would be interested in the Indian independence movement are those which are in close competition with Britain in world politics and commerce. At present, the United States, Japan and France are in a position to have an independent foreign policy if they choose, without fearing very much from Great Britain. It is the policy of Britain to tie up these Powers so that they will not develop an independent foreign policy which might threaten her interests. Next come Italy, Germany and Russia. Britain courts them in such a way that they will probably remain subservient to her policies for some time. Nevertheless, Indian statesmen who realize the Indian position in world politics should endeavor to establish independent foreign relations with all these powers. The political pendulum of international politics is always on the swing, and there is no doubt that there will be constant change of policy among nations. Indian statesmen should be active in establishing understandings with those powers whose interests it will be to aid India against Britain's domination. Britain holds India through India's isolation in world politics. No Indian statesman with a conscience, can ignore the fact that India has been the means of enslavement of various nations in Asia and Africa. It is a matter of duty for India so to act that through her efforts and the new orientation of world politics these nations will be free.

India will fall short of her own ideals if political independence of India does not breathe the idealism

of "Rajdharma," (ruling based upon the creed of righteousness). Peace on earth and good will to men should be the guiding principle of Indian statesmanship; and with that idealism they should take a stand in world politics. A republic in India will be in favor of the doctrine that all nations should be free to work out their destinies without external interference. A republic in India will be a factor in bringing about world peace.

XV

INDIA A WORLD POWER—THE FUTURE

As India is the pivot of the British Empire which looms very large in world affairs—politically, economically and industrially, any change in India must affect the British Empire and the world for good or evil. The question of the future of India, even if it does not affect the outside world, cannot be ignored because it is a problem which concerns one-fifth of the population of the world.

There are several possibilities for the future of India:

1. By using force, India may be kept in subjection for some time, without any voice in the direction of her own affairs.

2. India may be conquered by some other powers defeating Britain.

3. India may enjoy as much self-government as is consistent with the interest of the British imperial system.

4. India may become free and independent from all foreign yokes, and establish a Federated Republic of the United States of India.

Taking the first possibility we recognize two as-

pects of the continuation of the British rule in India. (a) Its effect upon the people of India, (b) its effect upon the world at large. It is often argued by those who support British rule in India, that India is not fit for self-government. This is an argument of imperialists of all ages against a people kept in subjection. This argument was used by the Austrians against Italy, Poland and other countries,—but the Austrian Empire fell and upon its ruins many independent nations have arisen. India is now in subjection; but for centuries she governed herself, which indicates that the ability for self-government is not lacking in the people. It is true that India will make mistakes as all governments, including the Government of Great Britain, make mistakes. It has been well said by Lord Meston, "Mistakes there must be, for by mistakes is the truest experience gained."

Indeed, there may come temporary chaos in India during the period of transition when the country is to emerge from foreign rule to her absolute independence, but this can never be the justification for continuation of British rule in India, because a *good* government inspired from without, can never be a true substitute for *self*-government even if bad.

At the most, what Mr. Bertrand Russell has to say regarding the present chaotic condition in China may be applicable to India.

"The English in the seventeenth century, the French in the eighteenth, the Americans in the nineteenth and the Russians in our own day have passed

through years of anarchy and civil war, which were essential to their development, and could not have been curtailed by outside interference without great detriment to the final solution. So it is with China, if they are let alone they will in the end find a solution suitable to their character, which we should certainly not do. A solution slowly reached by themselves may be stable, whereas one prematurely imposed by outside powers will be artificial and therefore unstable." ¹⁰⁹

Again, it must not be forgotten that British Government in India is not a good government, and it stands condemned before the world because its principle motive has been profit in preference to the benefit of the people of India and fitting them for self-government. The very fact of neglect of education and long exclusion of the people of India from responsible positions in the Government of India makes the charge conclusive.

Regarding the British misrule of India, Rev. Dr. Charles Cuthbert Hall, late President of the Union Theological Seminary of New York, and Burrows Lecturer on the Orient has remarked:

"There is no denying the fact that England is administering India for England's benefit and not India's. It is hard for me to say this, because until I went to India my sympathies were all on the English side. My early education was much in England and I have many dear personal friends there. But

¹⁰⁹ RUSSELL, BERTRAND: *The Problem of China* (1922) pp. 187-188.

*what I am saying now is the truth, and the truth must be told. . . . The obvious fact stares us in the face that there is at no time, in no year, any shortage of food-stuffs in India. The trouble is that the taxes imposed by the British Government being fifty per cent. of produce, the Indian starves that England's annual revenue may not be diminished by a dollar. Eighty per cent. of the whole population has been thrown back upon the soil because England's discriminating duties have ruined practically every branch of native manufacture; and these tillers of the soil, when they have sold themselves for the last time to the money lender, when they have over and over again mortgaged their crops and their bit of land, are sold by the tax-collector to wander about until they drop of starvation. . . . We send shiploads of grain to India, but there is plenty of grain in India. The trouble is the people have been ground down until they are too poor to buy it. Famine is chronic there now, though the same shipments of foodstuffs are made annually to England, the same drainage of millions of dollars goes on every year. . . ."*¹¹⁰

The real motive of the British rule in India and its effects upon the Indian people has been described by Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, formerly American Minister to China and once head of the department of political science in the University of Wisconsin, in his "In-

¹¹⁰ From a speech in the Bar Association Club House, New York, quoted in the *Public*, November 20, 1908.

tellectual and Political Currents in the Far East." He says:

"The present situation in India illustrates some of the unfortunate results of the political dependence of a civilized people. Not only politically, but also in economic matters, India is kept in a state of dependence on the metropole. But the most hopeless feature of the situation is that the men who would naturally be leaders in government and enterprises, find themselves excluded from opportunities for exercising legitimate power in their own country. Such a decapitation of an entire people is a great sacrifice to impose, even in return for the blessings of peace and an efficient policing of the country. The continuance of this policy would mean either the total destruction and degradation of Indian national life, or the end of the British Raj."

About the evil effects of the British rule in India, Mr. Fielding-Hall, once a British Civil Servant in India, has said:

"It [discontent] is universal, in all provinces, in all classes, directed not against this act or that act, but against the government as a whole. . . . And this discontent is not sudden. It has grown slowly for many years. . . . India feels uncomfortable, and clamours for anything she can get. The Indian Government gives what it can, offering profusest condolence, which is sincere; and for the rest sitting on the chest. . . . Man is gregarious, and he is so made that he cannot fully develop himself except

in larger and again larger communities. To reach his full stature in any way, he must develop in all ways. He must feel himself part of ever greater organisms, the village first, the district and the nation—finally of humanity. But in India all this is impossible. Except the village, there is no community that exists even in name, and we have injured, almost destroyed even that. Thus an Indian has no means of growth. He cannot be a citizen of anything at all. Half his sympathies and abilities lie entirely fallow, therefore he cannot fully develop the other half. . . . In some ways the educated classes feel it most. Elsewhere, they see men of their class cultivating their patriotism, increasing that sense of being and work for others, of being valuable to the world at large, showing capacity for leading, ruling, thinking, advancing in a thousand ways, while none of it is for them. They want to express the genius of their races in wider forms than mere individuality, but they are not able to do so. They want a national science and literature and law; they cannot have it. No individual as an individual can achieve anything. Not till he feels he is a cell in a greater and more enduring life, can he develop. But this is not for India. . . .”¹¹¹

From the moral point of view Britain, in keeping India in subjection, has contributed to the degeneration of a people. Gandhi and his followers rightly hold that British Government in India, in its totality, has done more harm to India than any previous

¹¹¹ FIELDING-HALL, H.: *The Passing of Empire*, pp. 4-28.

system. "India is less manly under the British rule than she ever was before."

Various aspects of the effect of India under British rule affecting the world at large have been already discussed. In the past most of the European and other wars in which Britain was involved, were due to India more than to any other factor.

"In tracing the expansion of the British Empire from 1815 to 1878, the dominant considerations were India and trade-routes from England to India, from India to other colonies, and from other colonies to India. If we bear these facts in mind we shall be able to discern the motives and the course of empire-building and British participation in international affairs." ¹¹²

The British Empire will in future face more wars because every effort for retaining India within the empire, and offsetting designs of other powers against India will create more international complications. In fact, the present grave situation in the Near East and Britain's aggressive attitude to make the Mediterranean a British lake and control the Black Sea primarily is for safeguarding India. Britain's Mesopotamian policy where "government by bombs from aeroplanes" is being carried on, is due to the idea of keeping India within the empire. Present Anglo-French rivalry in Asia Minor has much to do with Britain's control of India. Anglo-Russian relations are so much tinged

¹¹² GIBBONS, HERBERT ADAMS: *Introduction to World Politics*, p. 73.

with India that whenever Britain talks to Russia even on trade relations, she asks the Soviet Government not to threaten her in India.

If India be free and independent, then quarrels of European imperialisms will have less possibility of extending their vast scope to Asia. If there should be a war among European nations regarding the mastery over the Near East, Britain will not be likely to plunge into a struggle unless she is forced to do so to protect India, neither would it be possible for her to carry on the struggle unless she is sure of Indian aid. If India refuses to fight for Britain then Britain's attitude in the Near East will be more temperate. In fact, the modification of the British attitude towards Turkey is largely due to Indian agitation. If India agrees to fight for Britain then her attitude will be more uncompromising, and there may be a war in the Near East which Britain may win by mustering millions of Indian soldiers and using American money to equip them. Control of India, her immense man power, resources, and strategic position tempt Britain to extend her mastery over all South Asia refusing equal rights to other nations, which is a sure source of international irritation leading to war.

If India remains within the British Empire, directly and indirectly she will have to bear the consequences of British foreign policy. Under the present circumstances, unless there be a revolution against Britain, India as a part of the British Em-

pire has no other alternative than to go to war if the British statesmen feel that they should, to preserve imperial interest, fight France, Russia, Turkey or any other nation. But there is not the least doubt that India will be greatly benefited by preserving friendly relations with these nations. As long as India remains a part of the British Empire she will have to suffer and will not have freedom and opportunity to lend her strength and influence to the cause of world peace, at least peace in Asia. To remain within the British Empire is not desirable for the people of India for the same reason as it is not desirable for Britain to be a part of the French Empire or America to be a part of the Japanese Empire with a status of a self-governing colony.

But it will be argued that India needs British protection from foreign aggression. A free India will be able to take care of herself militarily from foreign invasion. Regarding the military possibilities of a free India, General Sir Ian Hamilton declares:

“There is material in the north of India, sufficient and fit, under good leadership, to shake the artificial society of Europe to its foundation once it dares to tamper with that militarism which now alone supplies it with any higher ideal than money and the luxury which that money can purchase. It is heroism, self-sacrifice and chivalry which redeem war and build up national character. What part do these heroic qualities find in the ignoble struggle be-

tween nations for commercial supremacy, with stock exchanges and wheat-pits for their battlefields? If then it is a question of finding leaders, a gradual diffusion of knowledge will produce those leaders, and once they have been found, how can England hope to retain under the British crown this vast empire permanently—unless the Indians are exactly in the same position of independence as Canadians and Australians today occupy?”¹¹³

The second possibility, that of India being conquered by any other power may be dismissed briefly. Such a contingency would not be favoured by the Indian people. Under the changed world conditions, it is not possible that any outside power can successfully invade India today. Soviet Russia, single-handed, is not in a position to invade India, and in fact its present policy, for its own self-interest, is to be on friendly terms with all nations, particularly the people of India. Afghanistan, Persia or Turkey lacks the power to conquer India. In fact, it is Indian man-power, arms and ammunitions that defeated during the World War. Germany is crippled and India has no fear from her. France has her problems in Germany, African colonies, Asia Minor to keep her occupied. France found it hard to keep Syria under control without Turkey's support, and had to secure Turkish friendship to preserve her own interest in Asia Minor. Japan has her own problems in China, and Eastern Asia. Japan's international position is not very enviable, because at any time

¹¹³ Footnote to page 210 of *Japan's Foreign Policy* by A. M. POOLEY.

she may be isolated in world politics, unless she has the support of Britain and America. Far-sighted Japanese have recognized the mistakes of the invasion of Siberia and aggression in Shantung, and the Japanese Government is re-tracing its steps towards peaceful relations. Under these circumstances Japan's coming to India to establish a dependency in place of England is rather fantastic. It is needless to add that there is no fear of American invasion of India.

Regarding the third alternative, that India may enjoy self-government within the empire, some of the British statesmen see clearly that the Indian people must have some voice in the self-government of their country, otherwise Britain may lose India. Recognizing the gross mistakes of the past, they are now addressing themselves to bring about changes in British administration in India. They hold that the Government of India Act of December, 1919, is the beginning of an experiment which will ultimately lead India to be a real partner of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Some of them argue that the time has already come when India should have the status of Canada, Australia or other self-governing dominions. This point of view is presented by Mr. Putnam Weale:

"It must be undoubted that long ago the advisability of interesting India as a world power, would have been apparent if the future had been properly studied; if men could have looked boldly over little internal complications, and seen the relations which

India really bore to the chaotic regions reaching straight to the Mediterranean. . . . But has not the time already arrived when India should be entitled to create a navy which, as the country grows in political understanding, should steadily grow in strength? Let us boldly ask, would not the flying of an Indian naval flag in the Persian Gulf, in the Arabian Sea, and even in the Mediterranean, not only animate the breast of Indian patriots, but convince all Europe and Asia that a new giant has grown up—a giant, no longer the helot of England, but England's real ally? Would not the politics of Afghanistan, of Persia, of Arbistan, and of Turkey—not to speak of that of which Egypt is the principle part—be enormously influenced, sooner or later by such a tremendous factor? . . . More important to India, both nationally and imperially, than any question of the adjacent seas is the question of adjacent lands. . . . Since it is an axiom that no power can be allowed to advance to the head of the Persian Gulf, it is high time that the future of the great plateau of Iran were considered. Why cannot a stream of Indian emigration be directed to that region—why cannot some policy more intelligent than the present one be attempted? Irrigation and the hand of Indian cultivators could regain vast regions which today are virtually deserts; schemes are feasible which would bring not only profit but honour; and by interesting the Indian people in great schemes beyond their own borders, giving them an inkling of what their future may be as a

colonizing race—instead of organized outrage being an ideal, there would come a speedy appreciation of the fact that a new era had dawned in which bombs had no legitimate place at all. . . . Abandoning all ambiguity it is abundantly clear that India's real future lies not only in industrialism—the factory servitude as some preach, but in territorial expansion; that is to say, racial expansion. That this will inevitably come some day is quite clear; but whether there will be in political tomorrow English statesmen able and fit to direct that expansion in such a manner that it partakes of the nature of natural migratory movement such as the movement of the English race to Canada, seems today doubtful. Yet India's horizon must be broadened; some compensation must be found for the restriction of Indian immigration to Africa and to America; in a word, that a new field for an overflow of swarming population must be marked down, so that virtual sterilization and stagnation do not at least become a new political menace—this admits no longer of any doubt. In the last analysis, only by such a policy will it be possible to secure not only the shores and hinterlands of the Persian Gulf, but the future balance of power in Asia.”¹¹⁴

This is a dream of Greater India under the British imperial system. Mrs. Annie Besant has similar dreams regarding India to protect British imperial interest in China and all over eastern Asia. The late Hon. G. K. Gokhale held that India will not only protect British interest in Asia and the Mediterranean, but will have a special sphere of interest in

¹¹⁴ WEALE, B. L. PUTNAM: *Conflict of the Color*, pp. 210-214.

Africa. The Constitution of the British Empire and the character of its different members make it impossible for the British to grant full dominion status to India. This would mean that India should assume an equal position with all British dominions. So long as it is the settled policy that the people of India must not be allowed to enjoy political and social equality with the British, self-government to India has no real meaning. Today the policy of discrimination against the people of India within the British Empire serves a precedent against their enjoying equal liberty in all lands as do Englishmen, Americans or Frenchmen. India under the present condition has nothing to gain by remaining within the empire.

Finally, then, the only alternative left is not in India under the British Empire, but a Republic of the United States of India. India must be the mistress of her destiny, and she should create such conditions as will enable her to throw her weight in international politics on the side of human liberty and justice.

Many people consider that on the whole the British Empire has been a great factor for the progress of the human race. To them anything that will curb the power and position of the British Empire is not desirable. They become horrified at the idea of India's separation from the British imperial system. However, they should not forget that a similar feeling prevailed toward the Roman Empire which preserved the Roman peace for the world.

Old Empires will fall and new powers will rise, as it has been the case in the past; and the human race will march on towards progress in spite of many changes. The World War has shorn Germany of her colonial empire, and Russia has lost many of her dependencies, but these are not irreparable calamities for the world, but will be for the good of humanity in the long run. So separation of India from the British Empire, will not destroy England; it will not cripple the British people in furthering the cause of human progress, but, on the contrary, will eliminate much evil due to Britain's imperialism, centred in India.

Regarding the present struggle and the future of India, Pandit Jawaralal Nehru, during his arrest and trial on the charge of criminal intimidation, made the following illuminating statement before the Court, on June 17, 1922:

"England is a mighty country with her armies and navies but today she is confronted with some things that are mightier. Her armies and navies have to face the suffering and self-sacrifice of a nation determined to be free and no man can doubt what the issue of such a struggle must be. We are fighting for our freedom for the freedom of our country and faith. We desire to injure no nation. We wish to have no dominion over others, but we must be free in our own country. . . . I have said many hard things about the British Government, but, for one thing, however, I must offer it my grateful thanks; for it has given us a chance of fighting in this most glorious struggle and surely few people

have had such an opportunity given them. The greater our suffering, the more difficult the tests we have to pass, the more splendid will be the future of India. India has not survived through thousands of years to go down now. England has not sent her (India's) noblest and best twenty-five thousand of her sons to the jails to give up the struggle. No, India's future is assured. Some men and women of little faith doubt and hesitate occasionally, but those who have vision can almost see the glory that will be India's."

India, the greater India, is a fact today, for her children are now scattered to the seven corners of the world, but they are treated as slaves and the title of an Indian of however high standing is no better than that of a coolie. Today every Indian is marked with the badge of slavery, and slaves cannot command due respect and equal opportunity. Freedom, absolute independence must be achieved so that hundreds of millions of people in India may contribute their fullest expression of manhood and womanhood, and work for human liberty and world peace.

So far as we can judge, India has a higher destiny than merely to be a factor in the British imperial system, providing balance of power in Asia, Africa, or Europe to Britain's advantage. Her future is to play a rôle in world politics independently. European balance of power will be influenced by the Federated Republic of the United States of India, free from all foreign control, because all nations

will have independent relations with free India, and the magnitude of Indian support politically and economically will not be a negligible factor.

China and India lived for more than three thousand years without a war. If China and India can coöperate, it is quite feasible that it will bring about a new peaceful equilibrium of Asia, if not the world. A free India will coöperate with all nations, not excluding England. It may be that if British policy changes and there be common interest of preserving peace between the United States of India and England there will be coöperation. If the Republic of India does not embark on an imperialistic policy of her own, she will serve as a check against any aggression against China, Persia and other nations. If Japan gives up her imperialistic scheme it is not too much to think that there can be Indo-Japanese coöperation to preserve peace in Asia. The Republic of India will be on the friendliest terms with the United States of America, the greatest of all republics, and this will help to insure better understanding between the nations of the world.

World peace is India's ideal. Mr. C. R. Das, the President-elect of the All India National Congress of 1922, speaks for India when he says:

"India stands for world peace. World peace, in my mind means the freedom of every nationality, and I go farther and say that no nation on the face of the earth can be really free when the other nations are in bondage."

APPENDIX

ANGLO-FRENCH DISCORD IN THE NEAR EAST AND INDIA

"It should not be overlooked that the first serious rift in Anglo-French relations since the war occurred over Syria. It has since grown to a chasm that threatens to engulf world peace; but the beginning was in the Near East."

—*Editor and Publisher*, Dec. 2, 1922.

On this point the King-Crane Report on the Near East, a suppressed official document of the United States Government, throws some interesting light:

"It is evident that the French feel resentment towards the British as not having played a fair game in the Syrian area. Without going into historical details, the Sykes-Picot agreement provided that France should have ownership or influence in a large area, including Damascus and Cilicia and extending to Sivas and Harpoot, while England should be in a similar position towards the former Turkish area southeast of this. At the present moment, France is threatened with the loss of all her sphere, while England complacently holds all that was then assigned to her, and extends her influence toward much of the rest. . . . The French feel that the English took advantage of their dire necessity, by which they were obliged to keep practically all of their men in France,

to occupy more than a due share of Syria, and to secure the affection of the Arabs.

"They also resent the payment by the English to the Emir Feisal of a large monthly subsidy, which they claim covers a multitude of bribes, and enables the British to stand off and show clean hands while Arab agents do dirty work in their interest. They feel that in arming the Arabs the British are working against the French. They claim further that British are more or less directly responsible for the undeniably strong anti-French feeling shown by practically all the Moslem and non-Catholic Christian elements of Syria. *They feel that Britain has been unable to resist the desire to connect Egypt with Mesopotamia under one control as a bulwark of India and a new field for commercial exploitation.*

"It cannot be denied that some of the French contentions are difficult of refutation, and that the whole situation is such that British honor would seem cleaner if Britain were to withdraw wholly from Syria. . . ."

—*Editor and Publisher*, Dec. 2, 1922, pp. xxii-xxiv.

The extent of British aid to Emir Feisal can be understood from the following extract of the same report:

"The British Government has been advancing money to his (Feisal's) government for a long time, and at present allows it \$750,000 per month (£150,000). Of this Feisal draws about \$200,000 per month for his personal expenses, staff, propaganda agents, etc. The balance is spent on the administration and the army of 7,000 and gendarmerie of 4,500, in supplement to the inadequate receipts from taxation."

—*Ibid*, page xxiv.

We often hear that if Britain leaves India, India will be overrun by the Moslems, but here we see that in order to cement British supremacy from Egypt to Mesopotamia, as a bulwark of India, Britain is spending millions of dollars for the Arab Moslems against France. Such men as Sir Gilbert Parker, Sir Philip Gibbs, Mr. Ratcliffe and others are warning the world, particularly the Americans, that in effect civilization is being menaced by Islamic hordes, but here we have the proof that Britain is aiding the Arab Moslems. Some day Arab soldiers may be used against the uprising in India as the Indian soldiers have been used in Egypt, Persia, China, Turkey and other parts of the world.

The Anglo-French discord in the Near East, Britain's friendly attitude towards Emir Feisal and opposition to the Angora government headed by Kemal Pasha, and France's opposition to the Arabs and friendship towards the Turks proves that the Near Eastern question is neither a question of conflict between Islam and Christianity, nor of racial conflict, but a question of extension of European supremacy in Asia in which the question of India plays a very important part.

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